REIMAGINING PUBLIC SAFETY IN THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS

A VISION FOR CHANGE

April 2022



Center For
POLICING EQUITY

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TO MAYOR TISHAURA O. JONES AND MEMBERS OF THE ST. LOUIS COMMUNITY

REIMAGINING *REQUIRES A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF A COMMUNITY'S TRUE SAFETY, AND A RECKONING WITH THE SYSTEMIC INJUSTICES AT PLAY.*

The Center for Policing Equity (CPE) is honored to present the following report as part of the City's ongoing efforts to reimagine public safety.

At CPE, we use the term "public safety" to refer to the shared responsibility of local government officials, police, and community members to ensure that all within the community are safe in their homes, neighborhoods, and the broader community. This responsibility belongs to–and requires the work of–multiple government agencies and community groups. Yet, for too long, policymakers have centered this public safety response within police departments, offering up law enforcement as the primary solution to a community's complex public safety needs. This singular approach cannot succeed in addressing the multiple and interconnected elements that drive community safety, including: food security, affordable housing, access to education, meaningful employment, and systems of care which can address the health and well being of communities.

As you and the residents of the city are well aware, violence is a significant part of any discourse regarding public safety in St. Louis. However, community violence is a symptom of underlying causes, including neighborhood segregation, concentrated poverty, and easy access to guns. Reimagining public safety requires that we work to address these root causes, and not situate responsibility solely with the police. CPE's goal in this report is to recommend an evidence-based, community-centered approach for reimagining public safety in St. Louis, one that places violence prevention within the broader context of the ways communities can both be over-policed and remain deeply underserved.

To truly reimagine public safety, we must let go of the assumption that police can be the primary solution to a community's safety needs–an assumption that is neither fair to the community nor to the police.



Dr. Tracie L. Keesee



Dr. Hans Menos

Reimagining requires a comprehensive assessment of a community's true safety, and a reckoning with the systemic injustices at play in housing, schooling, economic opportunity, and other key safety drivers. This is the work being done in St. Louis, which we are grateful to contribute to.

The journey to reimagine public safety will take time. While we work to build the systems we need, we must also work to improve the systems we have. Part of reimagining public safety involves reducing the harm of existing systems. For example, we offer up ways to refine the role of police in protecting the community, including a shift in patrol staffing to ensure fast and equitable response times across districts, and revisions to the department's use of force policy to minimize harm. A larger part of reimagining public safety is building new agencies or systems to meet the holistic safety needs of the community. To that end, we offer up recommendations for new public safety programs, including adding unarmed, alternative responders to reduce reliance on police, and investing in youth programs that can support healthy development and address some root causes of crime.

We are grateful for your leadership and the leadership of your administration. We are indebted to the long-standing work of the St. Louis community and its grassroots organizations, who have advocated for a new and better public safety vision for many years. We hope this report helps the city create a safer St. Louis for all.

Sincerely,

Dr. Tracie L. Keesee, *Co-Founder and Senior Vice President of Social Justice Initiatives,* **Center for Policing Equity**

Dr. Hans Menos, *Vice President, Triage Response Team,* **Center for Policing Equity**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE GOAL OF THIS REPORT IS TO PROVIDE A SERIES OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REIMAGINING PUBLIC SAFETY IN THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS. ***CPE RECOGNIZES THAT PUBLIC SAFETY IS MORE THAN JUST POLICING;*** *IT INVOLVES A NETWORK OF SYSTEMS AND SERVICES, ALL OF WHICH MUST WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT ALL RESIDENTS ARE SAFE.*

In order to reimagine public safety, there must first be an assessment of the current state of public safety. In this assessment, CPE conducted extensive research and analysis, including qualitative interviews with St. Louis residents, quantitative research on SLMPD activities, and a detailed review of current SLMPD policies related to public safety. The investigation uncovered the following key problems in the current state of public safety in St. Louis:

- Racial disparities in the harms inflicted by policing;
- Gaps and inconsistencies in SLMPD policies (especially related to use of force, pedestrian and vehicle stops, and interactions with people experiencing mental health emergencies);
- A need for non-police alternative responders for certain call types;
- Inefficiencies in the allocation of SLMPD patrol staff and resources, which create inequities in service levels;
- A need for accessible, affordable out-of-school time programming for St. Louis youth;
- Insufficient community engagement on the part of the City and SLMPD; and.
- A lack of robust accountability systems for SLMPD.

Based on these findings, CPE makes the following recommendations, organized by the agency or authority best positioned to enact the suggested reforms:

To the Mayor's Office:

- Invest in existing out-of-school time programs for youth and fund new programs where they are lacking, prioritizing neighborhoods with concentrated levels of poverty;
- Strengthen the City's response to Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) and family violence, with an emphasis on holistic, integrated services;
- Comprehensively engage the community in the development and implementation of new public safety strategies, including mechanisms to solicit

community input, and to disseminate clear information on the purpose and desired outcomes; and

- Expand the City's access to innovative, place-based public safety technology, enabling community participation in public safety decision-making, and targeting public safety interventions towards geographic areas that need them most.

To the St. Louis Department of Public Safety:

- Establish an alternative response function for certain low-risk 911 call types;
- Ensure that the 911/dispatch system is equipped to integrate alternative and specialized response systems; and
- Establish a community-centered process to examine the effectiveness of the city's Civilian Oversight Board.

To the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD):

- End the use of pretextual stops, and ban vehicle and pedestrian stops based solely on low-level violations;
- Improve data collection and analysis of vehicle and pedestrian stops, including examination of racial disparities;
- Unify and update the agency's use of force policy to better protect community members;
- Establish a review process for body-worn camera footage;
- Develop an updated, comprehensive policy on interactions with people experiencing mental health emergencies;
- Create a unified system for maintaining, updating, and publicly sharing agency policies;
- Assign patrol staff to districts based on the workload needs of those districts; and
- Evaluate the current prioritization level of acoustic gunshot detection activations.

By implementing the above recommendations, the City of St. Louis can significantly reimagine its public safety system by reducing the potential for police harm, ensuring the right responder is sent to the right call, and investing in long-term solutions to address root causes of violence.



CPE'S PROCESS AND TIMELINE

Through its National Justice Database program, CPE has been working with the City of St. Louis since 2016.

In 2021, this work expanded to include partnerships with SLMPD, the St. Louis Department of Public Safety, Forward Through Ferguson (a nonprofit organization established after the killing of Michael Brown), and the St. Louis Violence Prevention Commission (a collaborative working to reduce violence in the region).

Through these partnerships and its own research, CPE has developed a deep understanding of public safety in St. Louis. This report's findings and recommendations reflect the following key inputs:

- **Participation in collaborative work** to reimagine public safety in the City of St. Louis:
  - Regular meetings (initially biweekly and eventually weekly) with City of St. Louis leadership starting in July 2021;
  - Participation in Violence Prevention Commission (VPC) quarterly meetings; and
  - Participation in the City's Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) policy working group.
- **Gathering of community perspectives:**
  - Qualitative interviews with community leaders and residents (including leaders of local nonprofits, members of activist coalitions, and other residents);
  - Co-hosting of town halls on reimagining public safety; and
  - Attendance of town halls and community forums on reimagining public safety.
- **Quantitative research and data analysis:**
  - National Justice Database (NJD) analysis of racial disparities in SLMPD practices;
  - Analysis of SLMPD patrol workload and staffing; and
  - Analysis of SLMPD calls for service and outcomes of call responses.
- **Qualitative interviews** with City of St. Louis and SLMPD leadership:
  - Interviews with leadership at SLMPD, the St. Louis Department of Public Safety, and the Mayor's office.
- **Policy review:**
  - Review of SLMPD policies on use of force, pedestrian and vehicle stops, and crisis intervention;
  - Review of social science literature on how to improve public safety, reduce harm inflicted by police, and improve equity in policing; and
  - Review of additional research (by local and national NGOs) on public safety in St. Louis.



Dr. Hans Menos presenting on reimagining public safety in March 2022.



Members of the Center for Policing Equity team meeting with Mayor Jones in March 2022. *Left to right:* Hilary Rau, Dr. Robert Kenter, Dr. Hans Menos, Mayor Jones, Dr. Lucy Odigie-Turley, Matthew Graham and Renee Van Someren.

PROFILE OF ST. LOUIS COMMUNITY AND SLMPD

A CITY'S HISTORY, DEMOGRAPHICS, POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS, AND POLITICAL CONTEXT ALL INFORM ITS APPROACH TO PUBLIC SAFETY. *IN ST. LOUIS, THERE ARE UNIQUE DYNAMICS AT PLAY WHICH FRAME THE CITY'S CURRENT EFFORTS TO REIMAGINE PUBLIC SAFETY.*

Geography and Demographics

The City of St. Louis is located in the central eastern region of Missouri, near the confluence of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. The city, which separated from the adjacent St. Louis County in 1877, has a population of just over 300,000 residents, 46% of whom identify as Black and 44% of whom identify as White. The city's population has been in slight decline over the last decade.

St. Louis is a relatively low-income city. The City's median household income is ~$44K, which is 35% below the national median household income ($67.5K in 2020). The city's poverty rate is 21.8%, almost double the national poverty rate of 11.4%.

St. Louis is also a deeply segregated city. Delmar Boulevard ("the Delmar divide") separates the majority-Black north St. Louis and the majority-White south St. Louis. Centuries of systematic segregation and racism have resulted in significantly lower income and educational attainment, and significantly higher rates of violence north of the Delmar Divide.

History of Policing and Police-Community Relations

The St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD) was established in 1808 and now exists as a division within the St. Louis Public Safety Department (which also oversees the Fire Department, the Division of Corrections, and six other divisions). Until 2013, the City of St. Louis did not have control over its own police department. For 152 years, the State of Missouri had operational authority over St. Louis' police force via the state-appointed Board of Police Commissioners. City leaders argued that this structure–a Civil War construct invented by then-Missouri's segregationist governor to prevent the Union-friendly city from controlling its own forces–had long outlived any usefulness. Now under city control, SLMPD covers a geographic area of approximately 66 square miles and a population of 300,000. For the fiscal year ending in June 2020, department expenditure totaled $167M.

As of the end of 2020, there were approximately 1,200 commissioned officers within SLMPD. Officers were 84% male and 16% female; 66% White and 30% Black. Given that Black people make up almost half of the City's population, the racial composition of SLMPD officers means that White residents are more than twice as likely as Black residents to be represented in the police department.

In recent years, police-community relations have been painfully strained in St. Louis, punctuated by a series of police use of force incidents. In December 2011, SLMPD officer Jason Stockley fatally shot a 24-year-old Black man, Anthony Lamar Smith, at the end of a high-speed car chase. Following Stockley's acquittal for first-degree murder in September 2017, protests broke out across St. Louis. Over several days of protests, more than 160 people were arrested, police officers deployed tear gas and injured some protesters, and some officers were injured by thrown projectiles including bottles and bricks. Just three years earlier in August 2014, a Ferguson Police Department officer fatally shot an unarmed 18-year-old Black man, Michael Brown, in the nearby suburb of Ferguson. The killing sparked massive protests across the St. Louis region and in cities across the U.S., representing a watershed moment in the national reckoning with racial bias in policing.

Prior Reform Efforts

Facing rising pressure to minimize the harms inflicted by police, the City of St. Louis and SLMPD have adopted some new policies in recent years. For example, as part of a settlement in a lawsuit filed by several Ferguson protesters in 2015, SLMPD agreed to policy revisions prohibiting officers from using chemical agents as part of crowd control without first giving individuals "clear and unambiguous warnings" and enough time to safely leave the area. Also in 2015, former Mayor Francis Slay signed a bill establishing a Civilian Oversight Board (COB), designed to receive and review complaints about SLMPD. And in 2020, the St. Louis Board of Aldermen passed a bill placing additional limits on use of force by SLMPD officers, including banning chokeholds and strangleholds, and establishing a duty to intervene when an officer sees another officer use excessive force.

In addition to SLMPD policy changes, the City of St. Louis has also begun to invest in alternative and co-response programs to reduce reliance on police for responding to certain call types. In 2020, the City launched a new program colloquially known as "Cops and Clinicians," hiring social workers to respond to some mental health-related 911 calls. Through this initiative, some 911 calls are diverted directly to crisis counselors and mental health specialists, who can provide specialized assistance over the phone. In some cases, mental health specialists would respond in-person to calls for service, in partnership with police officers.

Despite these efforts, deep public safety problems remain in St. Louis, both in terms of harms inflicted upon community members by police and high levels of violence in the city. Although reliable data on police use of force is hard to come by, making comparisons between agencies difficult, advocates referencing national open source datasets have suggested that SLMPD had the highest rate of police killings per capita of any police department within the 100 largest U.S. cities. As this report details in a subsequent section, there were also significant racial disparities in SLMPD's pedestrian stops, vehicle stops, and uses of force from 2012-2019. Community violence is also an ongoing problem in the City: St. Louis' homicide rate is among the highest in the U.S. and has been rising since the early 2010s.

Moving from Reform to Reimagination

Efforts to reform and reimagine public safety have intensified under St. Louis' new mayor, Tishaura O. Jones. Elected in 2021, Mayor Jones campaigned on a promise to "put the public back in public safety," with a platform focused on decarceration, developing alternatives to police response, and holistic investment in communities to address the root causes of violence.

In September 2021, Mayor Jones–along with Public Safety Director Dr. Dan Isom, CPE, and the regional anti-violence collaborative Violence Prevention Commission (VPC)–held a virtual town hall meeting to outline the City's plans for reimagining public safety and to take questions from community members.



Mayor Tishaura O. Jones

"EVERY LIFE LOST TO VIOLENCE IS A TRAGEDY FOR BOTH THE VICTIMS' LOVED ONES AND OUR ENTIRE CITY. WHILE LAX GUN LAWS AT THE STATE LEVEL LIMIT OUR ABILITY TO TAKE ACTION WITH COMMON SENSE GUN SAFETY MEASURES AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, ***WE ARE USING EVERY TOOL IN OUR TOOLBOX TO IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY.***

POLICE CANNOT BE THE ONLY SOLUTION—*WE MUST ADDRESS ROOT CAUSES OF CRIME, LIKE POVERTY, AND ENGAGE COMMUNITIES TO SEE WHAT THEY NEED TO FEEL SAFE IN THEIR NEIGHBORHOODS."* [27]

Mayor Jones outlined three guiding principles for her administration's efforts to reimagine public safety in St. Louis:

- "Using smart-on-crime strategies to prevent crime, protect physical safety, and allow police to focus on solving violence;"
- "Building healthy communities [to] combat crime longterm through economic investment in disinvested neighborhoods, workforce development, and hiring 28 social workers to treat violence like the public health crisis it is" and
- "Responsive governing that listens to the demands of the people and develops real solutions to meet community needs."[28]

Mayor Jones has already begun to implement these guiding principles. For example, her administration is currently soliciting community input in the search for a new police chief, deploying a survey to identify the community's top public safety priorities and to gather questions to pose to candidates for the police chief role.[29] Additionally, the administration has deployed COVID-19 stimulus funding to support the Mayor's public safety goals, including dedicating $11.5M of American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) funding toward violence intervention programs, youth programming, and jobs creation. Another $58M was allocated towards urgent economic relief, including housing and utility assistance, direct payments, and support for the unhoused. Announcing the funding, Mayor Jones said, "Poverty, housing instability, lack of access to mental health services, scarce jobs and opportunities for our youth, disinvestment and the like. These are the real root causes of crime plaguing our city. This plan uses every tool available in our toolbox to address them."[30]

The City's public safety agencies have taken up the mantle of public safety reform, too. According to Sara Baker, the Mayor's Deputy Chief of Staff, "Synergy between the Police Chief, the Director of Public Safety, and the Mayor's office is really at an all time high–everyone recognizes the need, and everyone has bought into the idea of reimagining public safety."[31]

This holistic, community-driven approach to public safety informs the recommendations contained in this report.

CPE'S ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY IN ST. LOUIS

In forming its recommendations on reimagining public safety in the City of St. Louis, CPE conducted extensive research and analysis.

This included qualitative interviews with community members and City leaders, detailed review of SLMPD policies, and quantitative analysis on SLMPD workload and staffing.

In addition, CPE relied on existing research from other organizations. The goal of this process was to identify problems in St. Louis' current public safety system and to design evidence-based, community-centered solutions to address these problems directly. The remainder of this section details several of the significant–but addressable–problems that CPE identified in St. Louis.

Racial Disparities in the Impacts of Violence

The St. Louis community and City leadership both cite the level of violence–and its concentration in low-income, majority-Black neighborhoods–as a critical problem.

According to a 2022 report by Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, there were 262 homicides in the City of St. Louis in 2020, nearly 90% of which were committed with a gun. Given the city's population of ~300,000 people, the homicide rate in St. Louis was 16 times higher than the national average. In addition to these homicides, there are thousands of non-fatal shootings in St. Louis every year.[32] According to a 2020 report by Teneo Strategy, "St. Louis has consistently been ranked among the most dangerous cities in the United States."[33]

Violence is not evenly distributed throughout St. Louis. Instead, violence is intensely concentrated, with the vast majority of homicides and aggravated assaults occurring north of the Delmar Divide. Violence in St. Louis–as in most other American cities–is concentrated in poor, majority-Black neighborhoods that have been systematically segregated and excluded from economic opportunity. According to one study, Black residents in St. Louis are 2.5 times more likely than White residents to be victims of violence.[34]

The Mayor's office and the Department of Public Safety feel tremendous urgency to address the high rates of violence in St. Louis, especially in low-income, majority-Black neighborhoods. According to Sara Baker, formerly the Legislative and Policy Director at the American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri and currently the Mayor's Deputy Chief of Staff, "When we speak with community members, there's one thing that comes through all the time: exhaustion with the current level of violence."[35] Chief of SLMPD John Hayden Jr. told CPE: "Some of our neighborhoods have made progress, but violence is still concentrated, and there are still people in this city who hear gunshots all the time."[36]

Racial Disparities in the Harm Inflicted by Policing


In September 2021, CPE and SLMPD released the "National Justice Database Study Findings" report, capturing a 7-year (2012-2019) analysis of SLMPD's policing practices and behaviors.[1] The report was designed to help SLMPD "make data-driven reforms that advance more equitable policing." Specifically, the report analyzed three police practices–pedestrian stops, vehicle stops, and uses of force–and disaggregated this data by race in order to identify racially disproportionate impacts

[1] The National Justice Database (NJD) is the nation's first database tracking statistics on police behavior, standardizing data collection practices, and spurring data-driven reforms in participating departments. Because each agency collects data differently, CPE works with participating departments to identify and obtain the relevant data. CPE then analyzes the submitted data, measuring whether inequitable practices are at play within a department, what portion of identified racial disparities are likely to have resulted from police behavior, and the specific conditions that may play a part in these practices.

of policing. The analysis found significant and ongoing racial disparities in all three measures.[37]


Looking at available data over the study period, Black pedestrians were 2.3 times more likely to be stopped than White pedestrians. SLMPD officers are not mandated to comprehensively record all pedestrian stops. As such, the data analyzed does not include all pedestrian stops executed, and may underestimate the degree of disparity present in pedestrian stops. The disproportionate impact of pedestrian stops on Black pedestrians was most pronounced among adolescent and young adult pedestrians (ages 15-35). In neighborhoods experiencing average levels of crime and poverty, Black and White pedestrians were stopped at approximately the same rate but more affluent neighborhoods experienced larger disparities, with Black pedestrians stopped significantly more frequently than White pedestrians.[38]

SMLPD Pedestrian Stops by Race




CPE's 7-year analysis also found racial disparities in SLMPD's vehicle stops. Over the period of study, Black people made up 47.5% of St. Louis' population, but 65.4% of all drivers stopped by SLMPD. As such, Black drivers were 1.8 times more likely to be stopped than White drivers. Black drivers were more frequently stopped for "license violations," accounting for 38% of stops of Black drivers, compared to 20% of stops of White drivers. There were also disparities in vehicle stop outcomes, with Black drivers more likely to be cited or arrested subsequent to a vehicle stop than White drivers.[39] The annual number of incidents involving use of force by SLMPD decreased by 18.2% between 2012-2019. Over this period, Black people made up 47.5% of the St. Louis population, but 81.2% of people who were subject to use of force. As such, Black residents experienced use of force 4.3 times more often than White residents, and 3.3 times more often when controlling for crime rates and neighborhood demographics. While Black people of every age were overrepresented in use of force incidents, the racial disparity was greatest among children and young people aged 15-35. Black people were disproportionately impacted by all varieties of use of force, including weaponless force, chemical irritants, taser use, and firearm use.[40]

SMLPD Use of Force Incidents by Race




In addition to the NJD analysis, CPE conducted an assessment of SLMPD's calls for service and response outcomes between 2015-2019. The analysis identified disparities between districts, with the majority-Black north part of the city (districts 4, 5, and 6) experiencing more use of force incidents per capita. Districts 4 and 6 experienced the most use of force per capita, while district 2 (in the affluent, majority-White south part of the city) experienced by far the least:[41]

Geographic Distribution of Use of Force Incidents per Capita



Use of force incidents were most likely to emerge from officer initiated "preventative" calls, especially in the north St. Louis districts 4, 5, and 6:[42]

Use of Force Incidents per Capita by Incident Category and District



The identification of racial disparities in stops and use of force suggests a level of racial bias in SLMPD's policies and behaviors. These quantitative metrics are also reflected in community sentiment, with community members perceiving considerable inequities in the ways Black and White residents are policed.[43]

City leadership also recognizes the fact that racial disparities in St. Louis' public safety system have eroded community trust. Wilford Pinkney Jr., the Director of the Mayor's Office of Children, Youth, and Famlies told CPE, "The history here is one of mistrust, one of over-policing, and, quite frankly, of racism and discrimination."[44] Chief of Police Hayden expressed a similar sentiment: "There's a lot of mending still to do [in the relationship between the community and SLMPD]...We've had our own police use of force incidents and also national incidents that have caused a real strain in that relationship."[45]

Gaps and Inconsistencies in SLMPD Policies Related to Stops and Use of Force

In order to reduce racial disparities in police stops and use of force, SLMPD's existing policies will need to be strengthened. At the request of the City, CPE reviewed SLMPD's policies on use of force, pedestrian and vehicle stops, and stop data collection. CPE supplemented this with its own review of social science literature and promising practices from the field.

Social science literature suggests that stricter administrative policies are likely to improve police behavior. In general, human beings (not just police officers) are less likely to engage in discriminatory or violent behavior when criteria for decisions are clear and standardized.[46] When it comes to policing, literature suggests that restrictive use of force policies are associated with lower rates of use of force.[47] For example, in 2013, the Dallas Police Department implemented a new requirement that officers report all instances in which they pointed their weapons at a person. Researchers found that the new firearm pointing policy was associated with a reduction in the rate of shootings in which an officer mistook an item for a gun, and also with a gradual, long-term reduction in total police shootings. The policy change was not associated with an increase in officer injuries during officer-involved shooting incidents.[48] Furthermore, restrictive stop and search policies are associated with fewer searches, lower levels of racial disparity, and higher rates of contraband recovery.[49]

Use of Force

CPE found significant gaps and inconsistencies in SLMPD's use of force policy. The current policy is not unified, with different portions and revisions existing in different places. There are also several areas where the policy needs to be updated to clarify ambiguities, correct inaccuracies, and better protect St. Louis residents:

- **Under the current use of force policy,** SLMPD officers are required to classify any arrest in which "pepper mace" is used as "resisting arrest".[50] This is an example of backwards logic that retroactively justifies an officer's use of force based on the fact that the officer used force.
- **While there is a provision that "appropriate medical care" be summoned after force is used**, the policy does not necessarily require immediate evaluation by medical personnel.[51] A strong use of force policy should state clearly when medical personnel should be summoned, e.g. whenever a person is injured or claims to have been injured.
- **In the current policy, there is no requirement that force be proportional.** The policy authorizes the use of "non-deadly" force to prevent harm to the officer or others, "to restrain or subdue a resistant individual, or to bring any unlawful situation safely and effectively under control." but there is no mention of proportionality relative to the level of threat posed.[52]
- **The current policy bans "chokeholds or stranglehholds,"** defined as "any sustained and intentional pressure to the throat or windpipe which may prevent or hinder breathing or reduce intake of air."[53] While this provision addresses intake of air, it does not explicitly ban sustained pressure that may impede the flow of blood to the brain. There is also no reference to positional asphyxia (which occurs when someone's body position prevents the person from breathing adequately). Positional asphyxia can occur without a chokehold or stranglehold being applied.

- **The current policy erroneously denies the risks posed by Tasers and Oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray (also known as pepper spray)**. On Tasers, the policy states that, "[t]he electrical pulse effect does not cause long-term health issues."[54] This is incorrect, as Tasers can cause cardiac arrest in rare cases, especially after repeated or prolonged use near the chest.[55] On OC spray, the policy states that it "causes no permanent physical harm."[56] Again, this is inaccurate, as OC spray can, in rare cases, cause serious complications, especially when used in high concentrations or in poorly ventilated areas.[57]
- **SLMPD's policy currently lists several examples of when Taser use would be appropriate,** including on "a perceived mentally ill subject who may be violent and pose a threat to officers or others."[58] This language ("may be violent") is vague and doesn't align with standard law enforcement language about proportionality of force. Furthermore, specifically recommending use of force on people who are mentally ill is discriminatory.
- **There is nothing in the current use of force policy requiring routine analysis of racial and demographic disparities in SLMPD use of force.**

Pedestrian and Vehicle Stops

CPE found areas for improvement in SLMPD's policies governing pedestrian and vehicle stops. These problems in policy and practice may be contributing to the level of racial disparity in SLMPD's stops.

Traffic and pedestrian stops are some of the most common ways police interact with the public, with Black people more likely to be stopped than White people,[59] including in St. Louis.[60] Of particular concern are pretextual stops, those in which an officer pulls someone over for a minor violation, and uses the stop to investigate a more serious crime. Evidence shows that non-White drivers experience pretextual stops at a higher rate than White drivers.[61]

- **There is currently no ban on pretextual vehicle or pedestrian stops in St. Louis.** Evidence shows that bans on such pretextual stops can reduce racial disparities. In 2012, the Washington State Supreme Court allowed troopers to conduct pretextual stops (after previously banning the practice). When pretextual stops were allowed again, researchers recorded a larger increase in stops and searches of non-White drivers as compared to White drivers.[62]
- **Bans on stops for certain low-level violations should further reduce police stops, and thus the opportunity for pretextual police stops.** For example, in 2021, the city of Philadelphia banned traffic stops for minor violations like broken tail lights and improperly displayed license plates. While these violations are still illegal, they are handled by citations by mail.[63]
- **While state law requires data collection on vehicle stops, police in St. Louis are not required to collect data on pedestrian stops.** Mandatory data collection and analysis of both pedestrian and vehicle stops could further illuminate the nature and dynamics of such stops in St. Louis, including racial disparities.

Gaps in Police Accountability Mechanisms

Compounding the racial disparities in SLMPD activities is the lack of a robust accountability mechanism capable of investigating and disciplining police. Multiple community members interviewed by CPE expressed this sentiment, raising concerns that the current Civilian Oversight Board (COB) is understaffed and "toothless," lacking subpoena power or enforcement authority. There was a widespread desire among community interviewees for an expanded and improved COB with genuine enforcement authority.[64]

Body-worn body cameras offer another potential vehicle for accountability, but only if footage is regularly used to audit police actions during interactions with the public. SLMPD lacks a formal process for using body-worn cameras as an accountability and assessment tool.[65]

Inefficiencies in Patrol Staffing Driving Inequities in Service


In interviews with CPE, community members shared a sense that there is a clear division between the north and south of the city when it comes to police response times. They perceive that police responses are slower (or in some cases non-existent) in the majority-Black north

part of the city as compared to the majority-White south part of the city.[66]

CPE analysis confirms this community perception, and finds that response-time inequities may be driven by staffing imbalances between districts. CPE partnered with Matrix Consulting Group (Matrix) to conduct a comprehensive analysis of patrol workload and staffing in St. Louis, finding that staffing by district was not aligned with workload levels.[67]

Currently, patrol staffing is relatively equal across districts, with all districts within plus-or-minus 10% of the average staffing level. However, workload (calculated as hours needed to handle calls for service) is not equal between districts, with the highest workloads in districts 4, 5, and 6 (representing the north part of the City):[68]


Workload and Available Staffing by District (2019)




As demonstrated in the chart above, the 4th and 5th districts are the most "understaffed", with the biggest deficiencies in available staffing relative to share of workload. Meanwhile, the 2nd and 3rd districts are the most "overstaffed", with the biggest surpluses in available staffing relative to workload.

CPE analyzed calls for service between 2015-2019, validating Matrix's conclusion that workload is highest in the north part of St. Louis (districts 4, 5, and 6). Districts 4 and 6 had the highest number of calls for service per-capita, while district 2 had the lowest:[69]

Workload and Available Staffing by District (2019)





The imbalances in patrol staffing relative to workload create disparities in service levels, as reflected in response times. CPE analyzed response times between 2015-2019 using two metrics: dispatch time (the time from the initiation of the call for service to the time officers are dispatched), and time to close (the time from the initiation of the call for service to its documented closing time). Overall, dispatch times are quick, with a median dispatch time of under 1 minute across districts. However, there appear to be some disparities between districts, with slower dispatch times in district 5, and notably quicker dispatch times in district 2. There is a similar trend with time to close, with districts 4 and 5 experiencing longer times to close, and district 2 experiencing notably quicker times.[70] This may be related to Matrix's finding that districts 4 and 5 are understaffed relative to their workload.

The calls for service analysis was also segmented by individual census tracts, allowing for CPE to assess disparities between neighborhoods within the same district. A one standard deviation increase in the percentage of Black residents (the equivalent of increasing from 53% to 89%) was associated with slower dispatch times (an increase in average dispatch time of 0.26 minutes), and slower times to close (an increase in average time to close of 2.6 minutes).


The findings suggest reallocating patrol staff using a workload-based methodology (i.e. deploying patrol staff in a way that aligns staffing with workload across districts). This would improve equity in service levels between districts and in the experience of patrol officers.

In interviews with CPE, community members raised additional concerns about the amount of time and priority police give in responding to acoustic gunshot detection activations. These activations are currently a high priority response for SLMPD, but it is not clear to the community that they are an effective use of investigative resources.[71] This community perception is reflected in scientific research. An evaluation of acoustic gunshot detection systems in St. Louis found that they resulted in a significant increase in calls for service, conservatively translating to 1,200 officer hours per year responding to these calls.[72] While these calls led to increased workload, they did not significantly contribute to resolving gun crimes, and did not contribute to reductions in violence.[73]


A Need for Non-Police Alternative Responders

Call diversion can reduce the involvement of police in handling certain types of 911 calls, deploying alternative responders to those calls instead. For example, instead of involving police, a call diversion strategy may route 911 calls related to homelessness to mental health or social services. The below diagram represents a simplified, illustrative example of how a call diversion strategy could work:

ILLUSTRATIVE: BEFORE IMPLEMENTING CALL DIVERSION APPROACHES



ILLUSTRATIVE: AFTER IMPLEMENTING CALL DIVERSION APPROACHES



Alternative Responders

In assessing opportunities for call diversion, Matrix focused its analysis on the potential for non-police "civilian" responders, also known as Community Service Officers (CSOs), to handle low-risk calls for service. The analysis identified "significant opportunities" to divert certain 911 calls to unarmed CSOs–something that is widely desired by the community.[74] Deploying CSOs instead of police officers can enable quicker responses, free up police officers to deal with higher-risk calls, and reduce the opportunity for police use of force incidents.[75]

To determine the number of calls that could feasibly be handled by a CSO, Matrix analyzed 2019 SLMPD computer-aided dispatch (CAD) data, and studied existing CSO call diversion programs in other jurisdictions. Based on these inputs, Matrix concluded that 19 call types, representing approximately 42,000 calls for service in 2019, could be diverted to CSOs. Applying diversion ratios from other jurisdictions, Matrix estimated that approximately 22,000 of these calls could feasibly be diverted, which would save approximately 22,000 hours of workload for police officers:[76]

Incident Type	# of Calls	Avg. Time	% Diverted	# of Calls Diverted	Hours Diverted
Accident	14,256	47.2	40%	5,702	4,484
Accident Information	1,070	44.0	40%	428	314
Assist Motorist	2,399	31.9	50%	1,200	638
Traffic Control	452	57.6	50%	226	217
Parking Violation	5,217	117.0	80%	4,174	8,140
Auto Abandoned	568	55.8	80%	454	423
Larceny	2,700	44.3	55%	1,485	1,096
Larceny From Vehicle	514	47.6	65%	334	265
Fraud	211	54.3	65%	137	124
Auto Theft	992	47.0	65%	645	505


Incident Type	# of Calls	Avg. Time	% Diverted	# of Calls Diverted	Hours Diverted
Destruction Of Property	1,639	43.7	50%	820	597
Tampering With An Auto	947	36.0	50%	474	284
Dumping Rubbish	648	124.5	75%	486	1,008
Overdose	1,810	15.8	65%	1,177	309
Person Down	2,185	12.7	40%	874	185
Missing Person	1,338	51.1	50%	669	569
Recovered Article	806	75.6	70%	564	710
Recovered Auto	392	56.1	65%	255	238
TOTAL	**41,697**	**31.8**	**18%**	**22,234**	**22,117**

To determine how CSOs would need to be deployed, Matrix analyzed when these divertable call types most frequently occur. The majority of divertable calls occurred during the daytime, with 74% occurring within a 12-hour window from 7:00AM to 7:00PM. During this time period, there are between 5-8 divertible calls every hour.[77]

Based on the workload hours to be diverted, and an assumption that each CSO would be available for 1,700 hours per year, Matrix recommended the staffing of 15 CSOs to handle these diverted calls.[78]

There is widespread support for increased investment in alternative response models among St. Louis leadership. According to Mayor Jones, "It's about deploying the resources that we currently have and also making sure that we get the other resources we need to deploy the right resource to the right call."[79] This sentiment was echoed by Dan Isom, Director of the Public Safety Department: "Many problems that happen in the community do not require a police response...we want our police officers to focus on violent crimes, serious crimes."[80] SLMPD leadership is similarly optimistic about the potential for CSOs, seeing diversion as a way to remove lower-priority calls from police workload, allowing police to focus on preventing and solving violence.[81]

Frequency of Divertable Calls by Hour



Responses to Individuals Experiencing Mental Health Crisis

In interviews with CPE, community members were overwhelmingly in favor of mental health workers and clinicians taking on additional calls for service. One resident mentioned that "purple shirts"–the mental health professionals in the "Cops and Clinicians" program–have become a symbol in some parts of the city that residents are safe.[82] City leadership is also interested in increasing investment in alternative mental health responses, encouraged by positive early feedback on the City's mental health diversion and co-response programs.

Through its participation in the City's Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) working group, CPE has identified some key ways in which SLMPD should improve its policies and systems for interactions with people experiencing mental health crises:

- SLMPD lacks a unified CIT policy that defines what a mental health crisis call is; establishes what principles should guide responses to these calls; and details what specific steps should be taken by dispatch operators and responders.
- The current computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system does not allow dispatch operators to easily see whether or not a certain officer has received CIT training. This information would be an essential component of sending the right person to the right call.

Responses to Domestic Violence

In a November 2021 town hall on domestic violence (DV), CPE learned that there are also significant unmet needs when it comes to DV services. There is a desire from community members and city leadership for a more holistic response to domestic and family violence incidents,

involving DV responders outside of law enforcement. There is also a need for more services. In 2020, DV shelters in the St. Louis region had to turn away 5,000 bednights of shelter requests from DV victims for lack of space.[83] Community members voiced a need for safe, emergent housing, and access to holistic services, including trauma-informed counseling.[84]

Dispatch Resources to Enable Alternative Response Models

One barrier to integrating more alternative response models into St. Louis' public safety system is the lack of dispatch staff. In all of its interviews with city leadership, CPE heard that the City's 911 dispatch team is short more than 20 operators, causing delays in dispatch time, and limiting the unit's capacity to integrate alternative responders.

Insufficient Programming for St. Louis Youth

City leaders and community members interviewed by CPE overwhelmingly thought about public safety in broad terms, and rarely focused just on policing. Interviewees frequently thought that public safety should represent a system of services–including health, education, and infrastructure–that, when provided in an equitable way, create prosperity and safety for the whole community. This reflects Mayor Jones' approach to public safety, emphasizing the importance of addressing root causes of crime through long-term investments. According to Pinkney: "We need to think about why people engage in criminal behavior, and we need to address those root causes."[85]

Of particular importance was investing in additional programming for St. Louis youth.[86] A number of community interviewees focused on St. Louis' underfunded education system. Many referred to a lack of safe space for kids to get outside and be active. One community member referred to a lack of after-school and summer programming for children. Another mentioned how there are very few opportunities for high-school dropouts to learn skills or trades that could help them enter the workforce. Overwhelmingly, community members believed that investments in education and youth will ultimately have a positive impact on public safety.[87]

CPE reviewed social science literature on the value of youth programming. While there are some mixed results, the body of research suggests that school-based, after-school, and summer programming have the potential to reduce crime and improve outcomes for youth. For example, the "Becoming a Man" (BAM) program in Chicago–which provides group counseling to boys and young men in grades 7-12–was associated with a 28-35% reduction in total arrests; a 45-50% reduction in violence; a 21% reduction in recidivism; and a 19% increase in graduation rates for participating youth.[88]

While youth-focused programming has the potential to improve public safety, it is not adequately available and affordable in Missouri. The report "America After 3PM," issued by the Afterschool Alliance, found that for every child in a Missouri after-school program, there are three children waiting to get in. In 2020, 54% of Missouri parents reported that after-school programs are too expensive; and 38% reported that after-school programs are not available in their community. The inability to access after-school programs is even more pronounced for Black and Latinx families.[89] These statewide data points reflect what CPE heard from community members in St. Louis: there is a serious deficiency of programming and opportunities for youth.

Insufficient Community Engagement on the Part of the City and SLMPD

Community members interviewed voiced a desire for more and better community engagement by the City and SLMPD, both in terms of disseminating information to the community, and gathering community perspectives on key public safety decisions. City leadership also recognized this need; according to Dan Isom: "I think people are really asking for meaningful community engagement. One, to meet people where they are...then to be open to what the community wants and needs, and then responding to those needs."[90]

Dissemination of Key Information

A majority of community members interviewed by CPE felt that the City and SLMPD are not doing enough community engagement, especially in the majority-Black north part of St. Louis. Some interviewees noted that community



Mayor Jones and her team along with members of CPE, listening to Dr. Hans Menos discuss reimagining public safety at a March 2022 Meeting.

engagement has improved since Mayor Jones took office, but that there is more to be done. In particular, there was a desire for the City and SLMPD to do more outreach in spaces where the community naturally congregates (churches, recreation centers, schools, etc.) There was a sense that the lack of community engagement was partly to blame for key information gaps; for example, many community members were not aware that they could report crimes anonymously.[91]

Relatedly, there is a lack of public transparency and accessibility when it comes to the dissemination of SLMPD policies (for example those related to use of force, and pedestrian and vehicle stops). These policies are not displayed at all on the City of St. Louis or SLMPD websites, making it impossible for the public to access key departmental policies.

Community Participation in Key Public Safety Decisions

Both community members and city leadership wanted to establish mechanisms for the community to meaningfully participate in public safety decision-making.

To this end, CPE explored the potential of Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM), a technology that uses geospatial analysis to identify geographic areas with the highest public safety risks, and that can be used to democratize access to public safety data and decision-making.

In Newark, NJ, the Newark Public Safety Collaborative (powered by RTM) brings together community groups, businesses, city leaders, healthcare providers, and law enforcement to address place-based public safety risks. While RTM is used to direct law enforcement resources, it also enables the participation of non-law enforcement community stakeholders. Based on RTM data, the nonprofit Newark Community Street Team deploys outreach workers to help ensure safe passage for children walking to and from school along high-risk routes; and the nonprofit Newark Community Solutions adopted vacant lots in high-risk places and turned them into spaces for community programming. In this way, RTM can be a vehicle for evidence-based public safety improvements, and increased community engagement in public safety work.[92]

Relatedly, RTM can be used to inform the activities of city agencies outside of law enforcement. For example, in Atlantic City, NJ, RTM informed urban planning and development, with the city prioritizing remediation of vacant properties and installation of LED street lights in vulnerable areas.[93]

RTM has been used in large and small cities across the US, driving reductions in violence and other public safety problems. For example, a study conducted in Newark, NJ found that RTM contributed to statistically significant reductions in gun violence (35%), robbery (42%), and motor vehicle theft (33%) in the target areas compared to the control areas.[94]

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REIMAGINING PUBLIC SAFETY IN ST. LOUIS

BASED ON THE PROBLEMS OUTLINED ABOVE, ***CPE MAKES THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REIMAGINING PUBLIC SAFETY IN THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS.***

These recommendations are focused on reducing the harm inflicted by policing; optimizing existing systems of police response; and creating new systems which establish alternatives to policing, and address root causes of crime (like poverty, segregation, discrimination, and trauma). Recommendations below are organized by the agency or authority best positioned to enact the suggested reforms.

To the Mayor's Office:

Invest in additional programming for youth:

- Invest in new and existing after-school and summer programs, prioritizing neighborhoods with concentrated levels of poverty;
- Ensure that programs are accessible to children by providing need-based scholarships and access to safe, reliable transportation;
- Ensure that families are aware of available opportunities by engaging parents, including creating a public guide listing all after-school and summer opportunities for St. Louis youth (including scholarship information);
- Evaluate and measure the long-term impacts of youth participation in different types of after-school and summer programs (e.g., functional literacy proficiency, social-emotional learning competencies, high school graduation rates, youth referrals to the criminal legal system).

Strengthen the city's response to IPV and family violence, with an emphasis on holistic, integrated services:

- Concentrate the city's IPV and family violence systems (shelters, courts, police, victim services) under one umbrella center such as a Family Justice Center:
    - To advance referrals and greater access to services, strengthen the connection between SLMPD's crisis response units and existing IPV and family violence service providers.
- Expand programming to address both intimate partner violence and other forms of family violence:
    - Increase the number of hospital or clinic-based childhood trauma programs providing interventions to children who witness or experience violence;
    - Analyze current system services for their capacity to service underserved IPV and family violence victims, including men, transgender people, and others;
    - Track and publish the number of community members who access IPV and family violence services, and adjust service scale accordingly;
    - Expand housing assistance subsidies and services for victims of IPV and family violence.

Comprehensively engage the community in the development and implementation of new public safety strategies:

- For each new city public safety effort, develop a clear community engagement strategy, including mechanisms to solicit community input, and to disseminate clear information on the purpose and desired outcomes:
    - Any community engagement strategy should focus on reaching the city's most vulnerable members (i.e. racial minorities, low-income communities, the unhoused population), including identifying the best ways to connect with hard to reach populations;
    - Any community engagement strategy should focus on reaching community members in spaces in which they frequently congregate (i.e. neighborhood association groups, community meetings, school programs, recreation centers);
    - Solicit feedback from the community on the effectiveness of the city's public safety community engagement work.

Expand the city's access to innovative place-based public safety technology:

- Target public safety interventions (both police and non-police) towards areas with the highest risk of violence using Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM);
- Establish a public safety collaborative, comprising a wide range of stakeholders (including city agencies, businesses, and community groups) who will use RTM to direct their public safety efforts, and identify potential information streams to feed into the system;
- Partner with local academic institutions to evaluate the impact of RTM and the public safety collaborative.

To the St. Louis Department of Public Safety:

Establish an alternative response function for certain low-risk 911 call types:

- Create a new Community Service Officer (CSO) classification to handle certain types of low-risk calls for service;
- Hire 15 CSOs in an initial phase:
    - These officers should be unarmed, non-police officers, and housed within the Department of Public Safety, separate from SLMPD.

Ensure that the 911/dispatch system is equipped to integrate alternative and specialized response systems:

- Address dispatch staffing shortages;
- Revise the current CAD system to allow dispatchers to easily identify SLMPD officers that are CIT-trained;

- Revise protocols to require dispatch staff to inform callers of the availability of a mental health response (e.g. "911 do you need police, medical, fire, or mental health services?")
- Train 911/dispatch staff on the new CSO positions and the call types that will be routed to CSOs.

Establish a community-centered process to examine the effectiveness of the city's Civilian Oversight Board:

- In response to community concerns regarding the current form and function of the Civilian Oversight Board (COB), convene a task force including community members to examine the effectiveness of the COB (evaluating complaints brought, complaints heard, and outcomes of complaints), and to recommend possible changes to the board's mandate, authority, resources, and representation.

To the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD):

End the use of pretextual stops:

- In the interest of procedural justice and to reduce racial disparities in police stops, adopt a policy banning pretextual vehicle and pedestrian stops;
- Reduce the likelihood of pretextual stops by banning vehicle and pedestrian stops based solely on low level violations (e.g. tinted windows, registration violations, jaywalking);
- Prohibit officers from asking questions outside the scope of the original reason for a stop unless there is reasonable suspicion of serious additional criminal activity;
- Evaluate the impact of the ban on the number and nature of police stops, and analyze any racial disparities of such stops.

Improve data collection and analysis of vehicle and pedestrian stops:

- Mandate the collection of data, including demographic data, for all pedestrian stops;
- Establish a formal process for analyzing pedestrian and vehicle stop data, including assigning the work to data analysts within the agency:
  - Any analysis of vehicle and pedestrian stops should include an examination of racial disparities.

Unify and updated the agency's use of force policy:

- For purposes of clarity and transparency, adopt a singular use of force policy that contains all current elements and revisions in one document;
- Amend the use of force policy to require that use of force be proportional;
- Set clear, mandatory criteria for when medical aid must be summoned.
- Strengthen the agency's policy on neck restraints and positional asphyxia:
  - To strengthen the chokehold ban adopted in 2020, ban any pressure to the throat or windpipe that may hinder breathing or impede the flow of blood to the brain;
  - Add language to the policy that explains the risk of positional asphyxia.
- Strengthen the agency's policy on the use of Tasers and OC spray:
  - Remove the current requirement that OC spray incidents be classified as "resisting arrest";
  - Add language that accurately describes the risks of deploying OC spray and Tasers;
  - Remove provisions recommending Taser use on people experiencing mental health crises.

Establish a review process for body-worn camera footage:

- To maximize the potential of body-worn cameras (BWC), develop a system by which BWC footage is regularly reviewed by appropriate agency staff;
- Incorporate BWC footage into agency training as a way to identify positive behaviors (i.e. de-escalation), and examine negative actions (i.e. use of force);
- Working with academic research partners, develop a BWC evaluation rubric, based on the tenets

of procedural justice, which can be used to score individual officer's interactions;

- Conduct semi-annual audits of body-worn camera footage, and publish de-identified results.

Develop an updated policy on interactions with people experiencing mental health emergencies:

- Adopt a detailed policy regarding department interactions with people experiencing mental health emergencies; the policy should include:
    - A values statement (the principles guiding the department's interactions);
    - The obligations of key actors under the policy (i.e. dispatch, patrol officers, supervisors);
    - An emphasis on approaches designed to facilitate pre-arrest diversion to services;
    - Details on how the agency will transport persons in crisis and refer them to mental health services;
    - A process for data collection and documentation of mental health call responses.
- Create a unified system for maintaining, updating, and publishing agency policies:
- Establish a formal internal system to house all current agency policies;
- Publish all active agency policies on the City of St. Louis website;
- Create a process for receiving community input on agency policies (i.e. through town halls, meetings of the Board of Alderman, other forums).

Assign patrol staff to districts based on the workload needs of those districts:

- In order to ensure equitable patrol response times by district and a more sustainable workload for all patrol staff, create a patrol staffing structure that aligns with the workload of each district:
    - Track district workloads and adjust patrol staffing needs accordingly.

Evaluate the current prioritization level of acoustic gunshot detection activations:

- In response to public concern that acoustic gunshot detection is a strain on police resources, evaluate the categorization of acoustic gunshot detection activations as high priority calls;
- Evaluate the value of gunshot detection activations in solving gun crimes;
- In response to public privacy concerns, publish information on where gunshot detection sensors are located in the city.

CONCLUSION

CPE, THE ST. LOUIS COMMUNITY, AND CITY LEADERSHIP HAVE A SHARED VISION AND COMMITMENT: ***TO CREATE A PUBLIC SAFETY SYSTEM THAT MINIMIZES HARM, PRIORITIZES EQUITY, AND SERVES THE HOLISTIC NEEDS OF ALL COMMUNITY MEMBERS.***

The above research and recommendations represent a first step towards redesigning public safety in the City of St. Louis. CPE, the St. Louis community, and City leadership have a shared vision and commitment: to create a public safety system that minimizes harm, prioritizes equity, and serves the holistic needs of all community members. As with the creation of these recommendations, their implementation will require extensive collaboration between City leaders, public safety agencies, and community members.

CPE is honored to contribute to this process, and to continue its collaboration with the City of St. Louis on the journey of reimagining public safety.

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APPENDIX 1: MATRIX ANALYSIS

Report on the Field Services Analysis

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI

January 31, 2022

matrix consulting group

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1. Introduction and Executive Summary

(1) Overview of the Study

Matrix Consulting Group was retained by the Center for Policing Equity to conduct an analysis of St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department field services. The scope of the study includes the following:

- **Comprehensive analysis of patrol workload**, examining service needs and workload throughout the jurisdiction, including in both contract city environments and unincorporated precincts.

- **Assessment of patrol proactive (discretionary) time**, as well as how it is used.

- **Analysis of patrol staffing needs**, focusing on the capacity of patrol units to handle incoming workloads and be proactive in the field.

- **Study the feasibility of alternative response programs**, examining whether certain types of workload handled by patrol officers can be diverted to other service providers, such as civilian responders.

This final report represents the culmination of this process, and includes our findings and recommendations, as well as the methodology used to conduct the analysis.

(2) Findings

The analysis used computer-aided dispatch (CAD) data covering a period of five years to develop a comprehensive picture of patrol workload. For the purposes of analyzing staffing needs, 2019 data was used primarily.

To determine whether current staffing has the capacity to handle workloads, a critical step in the analysis was to determine the number of officers assigned to regular patrol roles – those function as the primary call responders of the department.

Department data systems present a somewhat unclear picture of the number of officers serving in these roles, by including many officers that are day-to-day functioning in other types of roles. These other assignments range from interning at an investigative unit, fulfilling a proactive detail at a specialized location, or numerous other roles. As a result, using the reported number of officers allocated to patrol would inherently overrepresent staff capacity. To adjust for this issue, a methodology was developed to estimate the

number of officers serving in regular patrol roles versus those in other assignments, based off of a 2022 point-in-time snapshot analysis that counted these numbers precisely.

Nonetheless, the adjustments made to correct this issue provided for a comprehensive analysis of patrol workload and staffing needs to be conducted, from which a number of findings are clear:

- At an overall level based on the workload handled by patrol currently, staffing assigned to patrol is understaffed.
- This has been exacerbated, if not partly due to, being reassigned to other roles that are not regular patrol roles (i.e., field call handling).
- There are significant opportunities to implement a program of diverting non-emergency, low-priority calls for service to civilian responders.
- There are significant imbalances in staff assigned to patrol districts and platoons relative to the workload they handle.
- Reallocating staff between districts and within platoons can fundamentally improve equity in service levels and the experience of officers on duty.

The project team has developed a series of recommendations to mitigate and remedy these issues.

(3) Recommendations:

- To achieve a proactive time level of 40%, 438 officers should be allocated to regular patrol roles (i.e., excluding those on detachments or details). This represents 58 additional officers above the current (January 2022) level.
- Formally record and track the reassignment of patrol personnel to duties other than regular patrol.
- Reduce the number of detachments and temporary assignments of patrol personnel to meet staffing needs.
- Create a new Community Service Officer (CSO) classification to handle certain types of low-priority calls for service,
- Add 15 CSOs and deploy the positions to patrol day and afternoon watches.

- Adopt the revised system for allocating officers to patrol platoons using a workload-based methodology.

2. Analysis of Call for Service Workloads

1. CAD Analysis Methodology

Our project team has calculated the community-generated workload of the department by analyzing computer aided dispatch (CAD) data that covered a five-year period from January 1st, 2016 to December 31st, 2020.

To conduct the single-year staffing analysis, calendar year 2019 is used , given that 2020 presents irregularities in patrol workload as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

CAD data provides a record of each incident the department was involved in, detailing each unit that was attached to the event. For an incident to be identified as a community-generated call for service that patrol responded to, each of the following conditions needed to be met:

- The incident must have been unique.
- The incident must have been first created in calendar year 2019 for the single-year analysis, or 2016-2020 for the multi-year analysis.
- The incident must have involved at least one officer assigned to patrol, as identified by the individual unit codes of each response to the call. If the first unit was a sergeant, but the second, third, or fourth unit in the car was a patrol officer (or vice versa), then the response would still be included.
- The incident type of the event must have sufficiently corresponded to a community-generated event. Call types that could be identified with a high level of certainty as being either self-initiated (e.g., traffic stops) or other kinds of activity generated by the department (e.g., directed patrol) are not counted as community-generated calls for service. In practice, this filter is largely redundant with previous steps.
- There must have been no major irregularities or issues with the data recorded for the incident that would prevent sufficient analysis, such as having no unit code or lack of any time stamps.

After filtering through the data using the methodology outlined above, the remaining incidents represent the community-generated calls for service handled by SLMPD patrol units.

2. Analysis of Patrol Workload

As described previously, for the majority of this chapter, 2019 data is presented, except where noted for the purpose of analyzing trends.

(1) Calls for Service by Hour and Weekday

The following table displays the total number of calls for service handled by patrol units by hour and day of week:


Calls for Service by Hour and Weekday (2019)

Hour	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Total
12a	1,782	1,246	1,215	1,077	1,182	1,312	1,580	9,394
1am	1,577	1,003	958	920	915	1,022	1,371	7,766
2am	1,331	706	812	775	740	813	1,161	6,338
3am	1,109	625	630	618	603	681	986	5,252
4am	758	531	520	529	547	580	762	4,227
5am	643	530	677	564	527	556	591	4,088
6am	707	749	789	792	750	756	637	5,180
7am	830	1,080	1,131	1,101	1,099	1,161	798	7,200
8am	928	1,320	1,337	1,383	1,322	1,380	1,045	8,715
9am	1,130	1,396	1,429	1,442	1,415	1,429	1,284	9,525
10am	1,331	1,436	1,505	1,480	1,468	1,516	1,422	10,158
11am	1,402	1,578	1,508	1,541	1,523	1,675	1,640	10,867
12pm	1,594	1,623	1,701	1,603	1,663	1,688	1,746	11,618
1pm	1,587	1,652	1,679	1,623	1,567	1,787	1,677	11,572
2pm	1,530	1,699	1,646	1,613	1,629	1,765	1,697	11,579
3pm	1,567	1,861	1,877	1,836	1,918	1,945	1,649	12,653
4pm	1,636	1,917	2,031	1,905	1,857	2,025	1,705	13,076
5pm	1,655	1,841	2,102	2,000	2,015	2,057	1,713	13,383
6pm	1,624	1,851	1,938	1,797	1,798	1,921	1,757	12,686
7pm	1,667	1,710	1,798	1,775	1,750	1,807	1,700	12,207
8pm	1,651	1,637	1,733	1,629	1,667	1,743	1,811	11,871
9pm	1,712	1,605	1,706	1,679	1,777	1,841	1,838	12,158
10pm	1,629	1,549	1,658	1,550	1,721	1,735	1,876	11,718
11pm	1,409	1,419	1,533	1,457	1,505	1,726	1,916	10,965
Total	32,789	32,564	33,913	32,689	32,958	34,921	34,362	**234,196**

Total call activity does not vary significant by day, with Friday and Saturday having only marginally higher call for service totals compared to other days.

The hourly changes in call activity are relatively gradual, and represent a ‘flattened’ bell shape that forms a plateau for a period of about 10 hours:

Call for Service Activity by Hour (2019)



The difference in call activity during the nighttime hours compared to the day underscores the need to deploy resources in an efficient manner if staffing capabilities are to be maximized.

Notably, however, the period of drastically lower call activity during the late night and early morning hours is relatively short, lasting for only about half of a shift. This represents the period during which the least number of officers would need to be deployed to handle calls for service, not including other considerations, such as officer safety and emergency response capability.

(2) Calls for Service by Month

The following table displays calls for service totals by month, showing seasonal variation as a percentage difference from the quarterly average:


Calls for Service by Month (2019)

Month	# of CFS	Seasonal +/-
Jan	16,888	
Feb	15,751	-13.4%
Mar	18,081	
Apr	20,114	
May	21,907	+8.1%
Jun	21,277	
Jul	22,101	
Aug	21,460	+11.0%
Sep	21,410	
Oct	19,145	
Nov	17,782	-5.7%
Dec	18,280	
Total	**234,196**	

Call for service activity displays relatively extensive seasonal variation compared to many agencies – particularly those with more moderate climates. In busiest month, July, about 40% more calls for service occur compared to the least busy month (February).

These patterns have held relatively consistent over the entire five-year period, as the following chart demonstrates:

Calls for Service by Month (5YR Comparison)



The difference in total calls for service between the most and least active years generally stays within 10-20% of the average, with the exception of April 2016, which featured an unusually sharp reduction in calls.


(3) Most Common Types of Calls for Service

The following table provides the ten most common incident categories of calls for service handled by patrol units over the last year, as well as the average call handling time (HT)[1] for each:

[1] Handling time is defined as the total time in which a patrol unit was assigned to an incident. It is calculated as the difference between the recorded time stamps the unit being dispatched and cleared from the incident.

Most Common Call for Service Categories (2019)

Incident Type	# CFS	HT
DISTURBANCE	32,491	32.1
SUSPICIOUS PERSON	21,108	30.1
DISTURB.- DOMESTIC	15,879	37.0
ACCIDENT	14,256	47.2
SUSP. OCCUPANT–AUTO	11,936	25.6
CALLING FOR HELP	10,801	32.2
BURGLARY ALARM	10,386	22.6
SUNDRY	8,541	38.6
SHOTS FIRED	7,673	27.4
ASSAULT	7,592	47.2
All Other Types	93,533	50.7
Total	**234,196**	**40.4**



Certain call types have clearly defined periods of higher activity, which in many cases do not align with the overall patterns for call activity by hour. “Shots Fired” calls, for instance, peak during the nighttime, with 9:00PM to 11:00PM having by far the highest frequency of calls occurring.

(4) Call for Service Response Times by Priority Level

The following table displays call for service statistics priority level, showing the median (middle value) response time[2] and distribution of calls by response time for each category. 2019 CAD data analyzed by the project team did not contain priority level field. The data for 2020 did, however, and so that data is presented in this subsection:

[2] Response time is defined in this report as the duration between the call creation timestamp and the arrival time stamp for the first patrol officer on the scene.

Call for Service Response Time by Priority Level (2020)


Priority Level	# CFS	% of CFS	Median RT	RT Distribution (20 40 60)
1	2,426	2%	3.7	
2	94,963	64%	10.4	
3	44,187	30%	13.3	
4	6,196	4%	40.4	

The flatter of a distribution that is depicted in this chart, the less likely it is for calls to be responded to in a shorter amount of time. This is intuitive – higher priority calls for service, with Priority 1 being the most urgent, generate quicker response times. Conversely, the lowest-priority calls are more likely to have longer response times.

A median of 3.7 minutes for Priority 1 calls demonstrates an exceptional level of performance in emergency response. For priorities 2 and 3, response times under 15 minutes are also exemplary, and could potentially be illustrative of having sufficient capacity to handle incoming workloads. However, this finding does not in itself prove that there is sufficient resource capacity.

Priority 4 incidents often have a far longer response time, with a median of 40.4 minutes. While this could suggest insufficient resource capacity, this finding should be tempered somewhat by the relatively low frequency of these events, which represent just 4% of all community-generated calls for service handled by the department.

These ideas are also demonstrated by the following chart, which examines the probability that a call is responded to within a given timeframe by priority level:



Notably, this shows that around 95% of Priority 1 calls are responded to in under 30 minutes.

Among Priority 4 calls – the least 'severe' category of the four – just over 75% of calls are responded to in under 30 minutes, and around 88% are responded to within an hour.

3. Patrol Discretionary Time and Resource Needs

The following chapter examines the capacity of current staffing levels to handle workload and be proactive, as well as the usage of discretionary time when it is available.

1. Analysis of Patrol Resource Needs

To provide a high level of service, it is not enough for patrol units to function as call responders. Instead, officers must have sufficient time outside of community-driven workload to proactively address community issues, conduct problem-oriented policing, and perform other self-directed engagement activities within the community. As a result, patrol staffing needs are calculated not only from a standpoint of the capacity of current resources to handle workloads, but also their ability to provide a certain level of service beyond responding to calls.

As a result, developing an understanding of where, when, and what types of calls are received provides a detailed account of the service needs of the community. By measuring the time used in responding and handling these calls, the staffing requirements for meeting the community's service needs can then be determined.

With this focus in mind, the following sections examine process used by the project team to determine the patrol resource needs of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD) based on current workloads, staff availability, and service level objectives.

(1) Overview of the Resource Needs Analysis

An objective and accurate assessment of patrol staffing requires analysis of the following three factors:

i. The number of community-generated workload hours handled by patrol.

ii. The total number of hours that patrol is on-duty and able to handle those workloads, based on current staffing numbers and net availability factors (e.g., leave, administrative time, etc.).

iii. The remaining amount of time that patrol has to be proactive, which can also be referred to as "uncommitted" time.

This study defines the result of this process as, **patrol proactivity**, or the percentage of patrol officers' time in which they are *available and on-duty* that is *not* spent responding to community-generated calls for service. This calculation can also be expressed visually as an equation:

$$\frac{\text{Total Net Available Hours} - \text{Total CFS Workload Hours}}{\text{Total Net Available Hours}} = \%\ \text{Proactivity}$$

The result of this equation is the overall level of proactivity in patrol, which, in turn, provides a model for the ability of patrol units to be proactive given current resources and community-generated workloads. There are some qualifications to this, which include the following:

- Optimal proactivity levels are a generalized target, and a single percentage should be applied to every agency. The actual needs of an individual department vary based on a number of factors, including:
  - Other resources the department has to proactively engage with the community and address issues, such as a dedicated proactive unit.
  - Community expectations and ability to support a certain level of service.
  - Whether fluctuations in the workload levels throughout the day require additional or fewer resources to be staffed to provide adequate coverage.
- Sufficient proactivity at an overall level does not guarantee, based on workload patterns, and deployment schedules, that resources are sufficient throughout all times of the day and week.

Overall, as a large metropolitan police department that has many specialized units, SLMPD should generally target an overall proactivity level of **at least 40%** as an effective benchmark of patrol coverage.

(2) Determining the Number of Officers Assigned to Patrol

Before patrol proactive (discretionary) time can be calculated, there are some unique challenges to overcome in order to accurately model SLMPD staffing.

In terms of budgeted allocations, officers are formally assigned to position slots in the six districts. For a variety of reasons, however, officers that are formally assigned to

district patrol slots may function day-to-day in roles that are quite different from regular patrol.

There are a few major categories of reasons for why an officer may be formally ('on the books') assigned to patrol, but in reality, is not functioning in a patrol role:

- **Details:** Officers are temporarily pulled from patrol to staff another field function. This could last as long as a day for a special event such as July 4th in a non-overtime capacity, or on a more regular assignment such as a detail deployment in Forest Park.

- **Detachments:** Indefinite reassignments or 'loans' to other parts of the organization. For instance, an officer could be assigned as an intern to an investigative unit.

All D Platoon officers, which in most districts represent an allocation of 7-9 officers, are functioning in other assignments, and thus are not included in this analysis. Instead, the analysis focuses on Platoons A, B, and C, examining how many are assigned to patrol.

The project team received several data sources from which to develop an understanding of this number.

- A position allocation report exported from the department's personnel management system, which counts the number of officers allocated to patrol by district, platoon, and bracket (team). This data was provided for early January in the years 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2022.

- Watch sheets, which depict real world examples of how positions are actually deployed and functioning on a point-in-time basis. This data was used for a selection of platoons in early January, 2022 – approximately the same time period as the one-time staffing analysis.

- A one-time staffing analysis that individually examined each platoon by district to count how many officers are actually functioning in patrol roles out of those assigned. The analysis focuses on 2022, but is the most accurate way of counting patrol assignments.

Each of the three datasets essentially overlap at one specific point in time: In early January, 2022. While the CAD data analyzed by the project team does not cover this

period, it provides for a means for comparing the datasets to examine any differences between them.

The watch sheets and the one-time staffing analysis line up almost exactly, with a few differences in the watch sheets resulting from day-to-day changes in assignments that took place over roughly one week that elapsed between the one-time staffing analysis and the watch sheet samples. These real world examples from the watch sheets were able to validate and confirm the one-time staffing analysis, which depicts far fewer personnel assigned to patrol roles (**380**) than the position reports (**463**)[3]. The 83 additional positions reflected in the position reports are equivalent to the number of detached personnel and details described in the one-time analysis.

Thus, given these considerations, the one-time staffing analysis presents a true picture of how many officers are actually assigned to patrol roles, while the position breakdown includes that number plus temporary details and assignments. To examine staffing needs currently, the 2022 staffing analysis provides an accurate figure to determine how many additional (or fewer) officers are needed to reach service level targets. To examine how proactive (discretionary) time has changed historically over the entire five-year period of 2016-2020, **the relationship between actual assignments and position allocations that exists in 2022 must be held as a constant for previous years**. This assumes that details, detachments, and any difference between the number of officers actually functioning in patrol roles versus those allocated, represent approximately 21.33% of officers assigned to platoons, A, B, and C.

(3) Adjusting for Multiple-Officer Cars

Most police departments staff patrol cars with one officer, excluding those staffed by a trainee (equivalent to a PPO) who only rides with an FTO. A number of large metropolitan police departments, such as San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) and Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), deploy two-officer cars exclusively. Some, such as the Kansas City (MO) Police Department, use a mixture of one and two-officer cars in the field.

[3] It should be noted that these figures do not include Housing Officers, as the workload analysis does not include their calls, nor does it include Bike Officers for the same reason. Instead, this analysis focuses exclusively on patrol workload and its own staffing's capacity to handle it.

These factors are important to consider in this analysis, as they impact resource availability and a number of other factors. Each patrol car functions as a single patrol unit. Whether they are staffed by one or two officers, when the unit is dispatched to a call, both become committed to the call. Consider a situation where a call occurs that requires one officer to handle it. If two officers are deployed separately in two separate cars, one handles the call, while the other remains proactive (on discretionary time). In a two-person car, both officers are instead committed to the call.

While there is an inherent efficiency to one-person calls, given that many calls require only one officer to handle, the reality is more complicated than that example. Many calls must*, however,* be to be handled by two or more officers, and so any availability gained from deploying two one-officer cars is traded for an additional backup response that commits both officers anyway.

Nonetheless, our workload data centers around responses by patrol cars – referred to here as patrol units. This requires a methodology to be developed to convert staffing figures to a realistic depiction of how patrol cars are actually deployed in the field.

An additional factor specific to SLMPD are the roles and limitations of probationary police officers (PPOs). For their first 90 days after graduating the academy and being assigned to patrol, they are considered in training, and cannot ride alone. If a call requires two officers to handle, they do not count toward that requirement. Officers are considered PPOs for a year, however, and so for the vast majority of that time period, they are able to staff a patrol car independently (although this does not necessarily mean that they will) and they also count toward the number needed to handle a call.

There is not a method to systematically extract the PPOs in training versus those that are not. Watch sheet formats differ by platoon and district. While some distinguish these two parameters from one another, others do not. The one-time staffing analysis used to count patrol assignments includes both within the totals. Thus, this analysis necessarily includes PPOs in patrol officer counts. However, this underscores the need to translate patrol officer counts into the number of patrol units (cars) that are actually deployed and able to respond to calls and be proactive.

The CAD data received by the project team does inform whether the unit was staffed by one officer or more. This was used to model the proportion of each type of deployment:

Type of Unit in Call for Service Responses (2019)

# Officers Per Car	# of Responses[4]	% of Cars
1 officer	235,608	62.1%
2 officers	140,551	37.0%
3 officers	3,154	0.8%
4 officers	148	0.0%

All figures include PPOs, but do not include sergeants. It should be noted that the proportion of two-officer cars that were primary units (identified by having the highest handling time on the call) was much higher than those for backup units.

Nonetheless, the data provides for a proxy for the percentage of deployed cars that are staffed by one officer as opposed to more than one.

By translating these figures into the percentage of *individual officers* deployed as one, two, or four-officer units, the resulting percentages can be used to estimate the number of patrol units that a given staffing figure translates to.

Allocation of Positions to Deployment Type (2019)

# Officers Per Car	% of Cars	% of FTEs
One Officer	62.1%	44.7%
Two Officers	37.0%	53.4%
Three Officers	0.8%	1.8%
Four Officers	0.0%	0.1%

The rightmost column, which shows the percentage of officers assigned to patrol roles that are assigned to each deployment type, can be used to convert staffing numbers into the number of deployed cars. This provides for a more realistic model of patrol unit availability.

At an overall level using January 2022 staffing data, this methodology demonstrates that the 380 officers assigned to and functioning in regular patrol roles equate to 274

[4] Includes both primary and backup responses to community-generated calls for service handled by patrol units in calendar year 2019.

patrol units (cars) deployed in the field. These assumptions can be held constant throughout the data period used in the analysis.

Using the assumptions developed in the previous section for the number of personnel allocated to district patrol platoons (A/B/C) that are functioning in regular patrol assignments, as well as the framework for modeling patrol cars with 1, 2, 3, or 4 officers per car, the following table calculates the number of patrol units (cars) in each year:

Calculation of Patrol Units From Multiyear Staffing Allocation Data

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
FTEs Allocated	429	487	514	475	495
Est. Assigned to Patrol	**352**	**400**	**422**	**390**	**406**
Patrol Car Factor[5]	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72
Patrol Units	**254**	**288**	**304**	**281**	**293**

Staffing levels peaked in 2018, where out of 514 officers allocated to patrol, 422 were in regular patrol roles. This translates to approximately 304 patrol units (cars), accounting for any regular two-person units and any cars with one or more PPOs riding in addition to the primary FTO officer.

Using these calculations, the assignments can be broken down by platoon. While this has also calculated for each district, for the purpose of clarity, district-level discretionary time and staffing needs are examined separately. As such, the following table shows these calculations on a citywide level for 2019:

Staffing Calculations by Platoon (2019)

Shift	Start	End	# of Patrol Officers Allocated	# of Patrol Officers Assigned	Modeled # of Patrol Cars
Platoon A	0700	1500	154	126	91
Platoon B	1500	2300	171	140	101
Platoon C	2300	0700	150	123	89
Total	–	–	**475**	**390**	**281**

[5] "Patrol Car Factor" uses calculated probabilities from CAD data on the number of cars with 1, 2, 3, or 4 officers per car to model how officers in patrol roles are distributed into patrol units (cars). The resulting figures form the basis of the staffing analysis in determining capacity to respond to calls for service.

Out of the 475 officers allocated in 2019, approximately 390 are assigned to patrol, using actual data from 2022 assignments to generate the estimate. Based on multi-officer cars, the 390 officers translate to 281 patrol units. This figure represents the core of the process of determining patrol unit capacity to handle workloads and be proactive during any remaining discretionary time.

(4) Patrol Officer Net Availability

Having developed a methodology to determine patrol officer staffing by year based off of position allocation reports and current-year relationships of these assignments to officers serving in regular patrol roles, as well as how these translate to deployed patrol units (cars), the analysis can now focus on their availability to handle workloads. Patrol officers work 8-hour shifts with semi-variable workdays that generally equate to 20 shifts per every four weeks. This equates to 40 hours per week, or 2,080 hours per year. However, officers' scheduled availability to work differs from their actual numbers of shifts worked on regular time.

As a result, it is critical to understand the amount of time that officers are on leave – including vacation, sick, injury, military, or any other type of leave – as well as any hours dedicated to on-duty court or training time, and all time spent on administrative tasks such as attending shift briefings. The impact of each of these factors is determined through a combination of calculations made from SLMPD data and estimates based on the experience of the project team, which are then subtracted from the base number of annual work hours per position.

The result represents the total **net available hours** of patrol officers, or the time in which they are on-duty and available to complete workloads and other activities in the field. This must be determined on a per-unit basis, seeking to determine the number of net available hours that each unit represents on average.

The table below outlines the calculation process in detail, outlining how each contributing factor is calculated:

Factors Used to Calculate Patrol Net Availability (2019)

Work Hours Per Year

The total number of scheduled work hours for patrol officers, without factoring in leave, training, or anything else that takes officers away from normal on-duty work. This factor forms the base number from which other availability factors are subtracted from.

Base number: **2,080 scheduled work hours per year per patrol officer**

Total Leave Hours (subtracted from total work hours per year)

Includes all types of leave, as well as injuries and military leave – anything that would cause officers that are normally scheduled to work on a specific day to instead not be on duty. As a result, this category excludes on-duty training, administrative time, and on-duty court time.

This number was derived from SLMPD work hour data, which shows for each employee, the number of hours they logged on duty by time category.

Excluding any overtime, court, and training hours, as well as any time spent on special details or detachments, the total was deducted from the number of work hours per year, resulting in the number of hours spent on leave. Officers must have been assigned to one of the six districts in at least 10 non-consecutive months to be included in the average.

Details and detachment assignments are not included as separate net availability categories, as these have been deducted from number of staff assigned to patrol instead.

Calculated from SLMPD data: **320 hours of leave per year per patrol officer**

On-Duty Court Time (subtracted from total work hours per year)

The total number of hours that each officer spends per year attending court while on duty, including transit time. Court attendance while on overtime is not included in the figure.

Work hour data provided by SLMPD allowed for the project team to isolate patrol officers specifically and examine how many hours were logged for court time while on overtime versus attendance on regular time.

Calculated from SLMPD data: **4 hours of on-duty court time per year per patrol officer**

On-Duty Training Time (subtracted from total work hours per year)

The total number of hours spent per year in training that are completed while on-duty and not on overtime.

SLMPD training data enabled the project team to isolate patrol officers specifically and calculate the number of training hours completed while on duty over the course of 2019.

Calculated from SLMPD data: **42 hours of on-duty training time per year per patrol officer**

Administrative Time (subtracted from total work hours per year)

The total number of hours per year spent completing administrative tasks while on-duty, including briefing, meal breaks, and various other activities.

The number is calculated as an estimate by multiplying 60 minutes of time per shift times the number of shifts actually worked by officers in a year after factoring out the shifts that are not worked as a result of leave being taken. This estimate is based off of the experience of the project team in surveying departments on this issue.

Estimated: **220 hours of administrative time per year per patrol officer**

Total Net Available Hours

After subtracting the previous factors from the total work hours per year, the remaining hours comprise the total *net available hours* for officers – the time in which they are available to work after accounting for all leave, on-duty training, court, and administrative time. Net availability can also be expressed as a percentage of the base number of work hours per year.

Calculated by subtracting the previously listed factors from the base number:
1,495 net available hours per officer per year

The following table summarizes this calculation process, displaying how each net availability factor contributes to the overall net availability of patrol officers:

Calculation of Patrol Officer Net Availability

Base Annual Work Hours		2,080
Total Leave Hours	-	320
On-Duty Training Hours	-	42
On-Duty Court Time Hours	-	4
Administrative Hours	-	220
Net Available Hours Per Officer	=	1,495

In order to calculate total net availability, patrol staffing must be translated into the number of patrol units (i.e., deployed cars), as discussed earlier in the section. The resulting figure is multiplied by the average net available hours per officer, to produce the total net available hours deployed per patrol unit:

Total Patrol Unit Net Available Hours

# Officers in Patrol Assignment		475
# Officers in Patrol Assignment		390
Equivalent Patrol Units Deployed		281
Net Available Hours Per Officer	×	1,495
Total Unit Net Available Hours	=	**420,018**

Overall, the 390 officers assigned to strictly patrol roles in 2019 (including PPOs) translate to 281 deployed patrol cars, for a total of 420,018 net available hours deployed per year, representing the time in which patrol units are on duty and able to respond to community-generated incidents and be proactive.

(5) Overview of Call for Service Workload Factors

The previous chapter of the report examined various trends in patrol workload, including variations by time of day and of week, common incident types, as well as a number of other methods. This section advances this analysis, detailing the full extent of the resource demands that these incidents create for responding patrol personnel.

Each call for service represents a certain amount of workload, much of which is not captured within just the handling time of the primary unit. Some of these factors can be calculated directly from data provided by the department, while others must be estimated due to limitations in their measurability.

The following table outlines the factors that must be considered in order to capture the full scope of community-generated workload, and provides an explanation of the process used to calculate each factor:

Factors Used to Calculate Total Patrol Workload (2019)

Number of Community-Generated Calls for Service

Data obtained from an export of CAD data covering a period of an entire year that has been analyzed and filtered in order to determine the number and characteristics of all community-generated activity handled by patrol officers.

Calculated from SLMPD data: **234,196 community-generated calls for service**

Primary Unit Handling Time

The time used by the primary unit to handle a community-generated call for service, including time spent traveling to the scene of the incident and the duration of on-scene time. For each incident, this number is calculated as the difference between 'call cleared' time stamp and the 'unit dispatched' time stamp.

In the experience of the project team, the average handling time is typically between 30 and 42 minutes in agencies where time spent writing reports and transporting/booking prisoners is *not* included within the recorded CAD data time stamps. At an average handling time of 40.4 minutes, SLMPD is toward the higher end of that range.

Calculated from SLMPD data: **40.4 minutes of handling time per call for service**

Number of Backup Unit Responses

The total number of backup unit responses to community-generated calls for service. This number often varies based on the severity of the call, as well as the geographical density of the area being served.

This number can also be expressed as the *rate* of backup unit responses to calls for service, and is inclusive of any additional backup units beyond the first.

Calculated from SLMPD data: **0.62 backup units per call for service**

Backup Unit Handling Time (multiplied by the rate)

The handling time for backup units responding to calls for service is calculated using the same process that was used for primary units, representing the time from the unit being dispatched to the unit clearing the call.

Calculated from SLMPD data: **27.8 minutes of handling time per backup unit**

Number of Reports Written

The total number of reports and other assignments relating to calls for service that have been completed by patrol units, estimated at one report written for every three calls for service. This includes any supporting work completed by backup units.

In this case, the number has been estimated based on the experience of the project team, at one report for every four community-generated calls for service.

Estimated: **0.25 reports written per call for service**

Report Writing Time (multiplied by the report writing rate)

The average amount of time it takes to complete a report or other assignment in relation to a call for service. Without any data detailing this specifically, report writing time must be estimated based on the experience of the project team. It is assumed that 45 minutes are spent per written report, including the time spent by backup units on supporting work assignments.

Estimated: **45 minutes per report**

Total Workload Per Call for Service

The total time involved in handling a community-generated call for service, including the factors calculated for primary and backup unit handling time, reporting writing time, and jail transport/booking time.

The product of multiplying this value by the calls for service total at each hour and day of the week is the number of hours of community-generated workload handled by patrol units – equating to approximately 268,671 total hours in 2019.

Calculated from previously listed factors: **68.8 total minutes of workload per call for service**

Each of the factors summarized in this section contribute to the overall picture of patrol workload – the total number of hours required for patrol units to handle community-generated calls for service, including primary and backup unit handling times, report writing time, and jail transport time.

These factors are summarized in the following table:

Summary of Call for Service Workload Factors (2019)

Total Calls for Service	**234,196**	59%
Avg. Primary Unit Handling Time	40.4 min.	
Backup Units Per CFS	**0.62**	25%
Avg. Backup Unit Handling Time	27.8 min.	
Reports Written Per CFS	**0.25**	16%
Time Per Report	45.0 min.	
Avg. Workload Per Call	68.8 min.	
Total Workload	**268,671 hrs.**	

Overall, each call represents an average workload of 68.8 minutes, including all time spent by the primary unit handling the call, the time spent by any backup units attached

to the call, as well as any reports or other assignments completed in relation to the incident.

In comparison to other years, 2019 is by no means an outlier, with slight changes occurring throughout the time period:

Patrol Workload Factors (2016–2020)

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Total Calls for Service	**240,325**	**240,576**	**236,464**	**234,196**	**221,623**
Avg. Primary Unit HT	40.2 min	41.7 min	41.9 min	40.4 min	38.2 min
Backup Units Per CFS	**0.57**	**0.53**	**0.64**	**0.62**	**0.70**
Avg. Backup Unit HT	26.3 min	28.1 min	28.5 min	27.8 min	28.2 min
Reports Written Per CFS	**0.25**	**0.25**	**0.25**	**0.25**	**0.25**
Time Per Report	45.0 min	45.0 min	45.0 min	45.0 min	45.0 min
Avg. Workload Per Call	66.3 min	67.7 min	71.4 min	68.8 min	69.2 min
Total Workload	**265,610 hr**	**271,499 hr**	**281,495 hr**	**268,671 hr**	**255,672 hr**

Focusing on 2019 because of the irregularity of 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and comparing that data to 2016, several trends are noticeable. As handling time has edged slightly higher for backup units (+6%), the backup rate has also increased (+10%), while total calls for service have decreased (-3%). This culminates in about 2.5 added minutes of handling time per call, resulting in more workload hours despite a slightly lower call volume.

(6) Calculation of Overall Patrol Proactivity

Using the results of the analysis of both patrol workloads and staff availability, it is possible to determine the remaining time in which patrol units can function proactively. The result can then function as a barometer from which to gauge the capacity of current resources to handle call workload demands, given objectives for meeting a certain service level.

The following table shows the calculation process used by the project team to determine overall proactivity levels, representing the percentage of time that patrol officers have available outside of handling community-generated workloads:

Calculation of Overall Patrol Proactivity (2019)

Total Patrol Net Available Hours		420,018
Total Patrol Workload Hours	–	268,671
Resulting # of Uncommitted Hours	=	151,347
Divided by Total Net Available Hours	÷	420,018
Overall Proactive Time Level	=	**36.0%**

Using 2019 workload data, patrol proactive time represents 36% of net available time on duty. In other words, 36% of the time a patrol car is deployed, it is not committed to a community-generated call for service. This time can represent breaks in between calls occurring, or it can be used to generate self-initiated activity such as traffic stops or community policing.

At 36%, patrol proactive time is below the basic threshold of 40% that was previously established for adequate staffing to be able to handle calls for service and remain proactive in an adequate capacity. Moreover, it is important to note that this is on a 12-month, 7 days per week, 24 hours per day basis. During busier times of the day, proactivity will be far lower than this. The same is true for the higher-activity summer months, and to a limited extent, days of the week with more workload.

Daytime variations in particular are significant, as shown by the following chart which indicates the calculated proactive time levels in four-hour blocks for each day of the week using 2019 data:

Proactivity by Hour and Weekday (2019)

	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Overall
2am–6am	56%	72%	70%	72%	72%	69%	60%	**67%**
6am–10am	52%	42%	44%	42%	42%	41%	51%	**45%**
10am–2pm	22%	19%	17%	17%	16%	8%	16%	**17%**
2pm–6pm	24%	18%	16%	18%	17%	12%	22%	**18%**
6pm–10pm	32%	33%	29%	33%	29%	29%	28%	**30%**
10pm–2am	33%	47%	47%	51%	47%	42%	33%	**43%**
Overall	36%	38%	36%	38%	37%	33%	35%	**36%**

The findings of the proactivity analysis expressed on an hourly basis are much more striking – proactive (discretionary) time drops below 20% during much of the daytime on nearly every day of the week. At these levels, calls for service will often occur at a faster rate than patrol cars are able to handle them, resulting in longer response times.

Given the severity of these issues, addressing the inadequate capacity at certain times of the day should be prioritized. The nature of these findings, however, are a function of two issues:

- At a proactive time level of 36%, staffing levels are inadequate on an overall basis relative to the amount of workload handled by patrol.

- Reconfiguring how patrol personnel are deployed, such as by adopting a different shift schedule or changing how personnel are allocated to each platoon, can significantly mitigate these issues by rebalancing staffing levels against workload at different times of the day.

- Diverting a portion of workload from patrol, such as non-emergency calls for service, can also work to address these issues.

Each of these three solutions will be examined separately in this analysis. Prior to examining solutions, it is worth examining how they have changed over time, as well as how these issues vary by patrol district.

(7) Patrol Proactive (Discretionary) Time by Year


The patrol proactive time calculations can be repeated for each year for which workload data was analyzed, as follows:

Calculation of Patrol Proactivity (2016–2020)

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
FTEs Allocated	429	487	514	475	495
Est. Patrol Assigned	352	400	422	390	406
Patrol Units	**254**	**288**	**304**	**281**	**293**
× NA Hours Per Unit	1,495	1,495	1,495	1,495	1,495
= Total Unit NA Hrs.	**379,660**	**430,481**	**454,397**	**420,018**	**437,955**
- Total Workload Hrs.	265,610	271,499	281,495	268,671	255,672
= Uncommitted Hrs.	**114,050**	**158,982**	**172,902**	**151,347**	**182,282**
÷ *Total Unit NA Hrs.*	*114,050*	*158,982*	*172,902*	*151,347*	*182,282*
= % Proactive Time	**30.0%**	**36.9%**	**38.1%**	**36.0%**	**41.6%**

The varying levels of proactive time are a function of changes to both patrol workload hours and patrol staffing (measured in net available hours). The following chart demonstrates how these values change year-over-year, both in absolute terms and in the percentage difference from 2016 figures:

Variation in Patrol Staffing and Workload Hours (2016–2020)



While workload hours have not changed significantly, staffing levels experienced considerable fluctuation, which, in response, impacted patrol proactive time.

Using staffing reports for each year of data that specify the number of officers allocated to each platoon and district, patrol proactive time is calculated on an hourly basis across the entire five-year period in the chapter focusing on staffing needs.

(8) Adjusting for Turnover to Examine Staffing Needs

To determine staffing needs, it is also important to consider the number of vacancies that currently exist, as well as the rate of turnover. An agency will never be fully staffed, as there will always be vacancies occurring as a result of retirement, termination, and other factors. When these events occur, it takes a significant amount of time to recruit a new position, complete the hiring process, run an academy, and complete the FTO program before the individual becomes an on-duty officer. Given this consideration, agencies must always hire above the number of officers needed to provide a targeted level of service.

The amount of 'buffer' that an agency requires should be based on the historical rate of attrition within patrol. Attrition can take many forms – if it is assumed that the majority of vacancies are carried in patrol staffing, a vacancy at the officer level in any other area of the organization would consequently remove one officer from regular patrol duties. Likewise, promotions would have the same effect, in that they create an open position slot in patrol. Not included, however, are positions that become vacant while the

individual is still in the academy or FTO program, and they are not counted in our analysis as being part of 'actual' patrol staffing.

Given these considerations, **an additional 5% *authorized* (budgeted) positions should be added on top of the actual number currently filled (actual) positions in order to account for turnover** while maintaining the ability to meet the targeted proactivity level. The resulting figure can then be rounded up to the nearest whole number, assuming that positions cannot be added fractionally. It is worth noting that the number of officers needed without turnover is fractional, as it is an intermediate step in the calculation process.

It is also worth noting that the staffing calculations do not take into account the effect of cumulative vacancies that are not able to be replaced and filled over a *multi-year* period. This is intended, as budgeting for additional staff does not fix recruiting, hiring, or training issues. Instead, the turnover factor is designed to provide a balance against the rate of attrition, assuming new recruits can complete the academy and FTO program each year.

(9) Calculation of Overall Patrol Staffing Needs

These calculations are shown in the following table using 2019 workload data, given that the most recent year of data used in the analysis (2020) is heavily affected by the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

It is critical to note that this is presented independently of the call diversion analysis, which examines opportunities to shift certain types of lower-priority calls for service to alternative non-sworn response. By reducing patrol workload, proactive time can be increased significantly, providing another method of addressing patrol staffing issues. Thus, the following table calculates patrol staffing needs should the issues be addressed *solely* with sworn staffing:

Calculation of Patrol Unit Staffing Needs (2019 Workload Figures)

Total Workload Hours		268,671
Proactivity Target		40%
Staffed Hours Needed	=	*447,784*
Net Available Hours Per Officer	÷	1,495
Turnover Factor	+	5%
Patrol Officer FTEs Needed	**=**	**438**

The resulting number of officer FTEs factors in the rate of multi-officer cars, and refers to the number of officers strictly assigned to regular patrol roles. Based on the current practice and rate of officers being detached to other assignments and placed on special details, 438 officers assigned to patrol roles equates to 534 officer positions allocated to platoons A, B, and C across the six patrol districts.

This highlights the issues caused by current practices of detachments and special details. As of January 2022, only 380 of 463 officers allocated to patrol are actually in patrol roles, with that number identified only through a manual one-time internal analysis, This number can be manually cross-referenced against watch sheets; however, the watch sheets themselves do not have a common format for documenting these issues.

As a result, under these circumstances, it is simply not possible to have a data-driven system for allocating resources. Without information on how many officers districts are short relative to their needs, staffing issues can be severely exacerbated, or even be entirely self-inflicted.

To address this issue, information management systems must be able to track in a centralized manner who is detached to another unit, assignment, or detail – even if that detail is temporary. Assignments to another function should be formalized, at least from the perspective of information systems.

Furthermore, the analysis shows that 438 officers must be assigned to regular patrol roles to achieve 40% proactive time. Currently (as of January 2022), there are 463 officers allocated to patrol – including detachments and other assignments. Of these,

380 are assigned to regular patrol roles, with the difference between them (83 officers) representing those reassigned, unavailable, or on detachments.

This analysis has shown that 438 officers are needed in regular patrol roles to reach 40% overall proactive time. Consequently, in order to meet staffing needs, 58 additional officers should be assigned to regular patrol roles. This can be accomplished through a variety of approaches, including reducing the number of detachments and special assignments, by increasing the budgeted number of staff allocated to patrol, or indirectly through implementation of call diversion approaches.

Recommendations:

To achieve a proactive time level of 40%, 438 officers should be allocated to regular patrol roles (i.e., excluding those on detachments or details). This represents 58 additional officers above the current (January 2022) level.

Formally record and track the reassignment of patrol personnel to duties other than regular patrol.

Reduce the number of detachments and temporary assignments of patrol personnel to meet staffing needs.

(10) Additional Conclusions Regarding Patrol Proactivity and Resource Needs

The overall patrol proactivity level should function as a barometer of potential resource capacity to handle workloads and be proactive, and different levels have varying implications for the effectiveness of an agency in being proactive at addressing public safety issues and engaging with the community. These considerations can be summarized as follows:

- In agencies that are severely understaffed in patrol functions, and consequently have very little proactive time (**under 35% overall**), calls will frequently be held in queues as resources cannot handle the incoming workload. Proactivity also falls behind, as officers in such agencies would have little to no time to be proactive. When gaps do occur, the high rate of workload relative to available time can have a limiting factor on self-initiated generation, as officers avoid being tied up on a proactive activity such as a traffic stop in case priority calls for service occur.


- As proactivity increases (**around 35-45% overall**), the generation of self-initiated activity rapidly increases, as officers are able to deal with already-identified

opportunities to proactively address issues in the community, some of which are prioritized and project-oriented engagements.

- Beyond those levels (**at least 45-50% overall)**, depending on scheduling and deployment efficiency, the time available for proactive policing increases further, and opportunities to engage in self-initiated activity expand. However, the number of priority needs for self-initiated activity (e.g., addressing narcotics activity) also decrease. Despite this, no limitations exist on the time that can be spent on activities such as saturation/directed patrols and community engagement activities.

The findings from this analysis are particularly notable given that as the proactivity level increases, the number of officers needed to raise it further grows exponentially. Whereas at low proactivity levels (<30%), adding several more officers would have a significant effect on overall proactivity, doing so at high proactivity levels (>60%) would have very little effect.

The following chart provides a visualization of this issue, showing the diminishing returns of adding additional officers on patrol proactivity and service levels, using 2019 workload figures:



At current proactive time levels, significant gains in proactive time are made from either adding staffing or reducing workload through call diversion, relative to the level of investment required.

2. Use of Discretionary Time to Conduct Proactive Policing

The analysis to this point has focused exclusively on the reactive portion of patrol workload, consisting of community-generated calls for service and related work. In the remaining available time, which is referred to in this report as proactive time, officers are able to proactively address public safety issues through targeted enforcement, saturation patrol, community engagement, problem-oriented policing projects, and other activity. Equally critical to the question of how much proactive time is available is how and whether it is used in this manner.

There are some limitations on how the use of proactive time is measured, however. Not all proactive policing efforts are tracked in CAD data, such as some informal area checks, saturation patrol, miscellaneous field contacts, and other types of activity. However, many categories of officer-initiated activity are nonetheless recorded, such as traffic stops, predictive policing efforts, and follow-up investigations.

Nonetheless, CAD data does provide for a significant portion of officer-initiated activity to be analyzed to examined for how utilized uncommitted time is for proactive policing.

(1) Self-Initiated Activity by Hour and Weekday

Self-initiated activity displays different hourly trends compared to community-generated calls for service, as illustrated in the following table:

Self-Initiated Activity by Hour and Weekday

Hour	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Total
12am	884	1,011	1,158	1,352	1,393	1,207	985	7,990
1am	893	1,113	1,224	1,370	1,446	1,214	1,038	8,298
2am	830	1,044	1,105	1,263	1,195	1,021	1,024	7,482
3am	716	897	934	1,118	1,138	932	780	6,515
4am	647	729	770	832	839	741	630	5,188
5am	464	537	550	637	612	565	532	3,897
6am	116	192	218	218	205	186	204	1,339
7am	228	340	372	397	360	426	321	2,444
8am	667	789	873	863	798	885	727	5,602
9am	766	1,024	1,174	1,125	1,162	1,123	938	7,312
10am	773	1,055	1,241	1,253	1,202	1,104	936	7,564
11am	760	1,101	1,252	1,230	1,181	1,102	839	7,465
12pm	713	1,099	1,213	1,176	1,107	950	786	7,044
1pm	578	1,053	1,165	1,112	942	880	690	6,420
2pm	273	530	615	566	513	425	309	3,231
3pm	324	511	579	571	549	396	389	3,319
4pm	790	828	992	1,033	963	778	841	6,225
5pm	714	1,028	1,150	1,043	968	873	918	6,694
6pm	647	933	1,021	975	950	853	750	6,129
7pm	605	794	855	910	812	733	613	5,322
8pm	574	774	783	779	766	746	629	5,051
9pm	437	614	665	664	675	644	550	4,249
10pm	188	238	275	268	271	315	240	1,795
11pm	496	506	537	568	479	485	399	3,470
Total	14,083	18,740	20,721	21,323	20,526	18,584	16,068	**130,045**

Interestingly, self-initiated occurs far more often in the first few hours of each shift, rather than when workload is highest. 4:00PM to 6:00PM includes some of the busiest


hours in terms of call for service workloads, and yet for the afternoon watch coming on duty an hour before at 3:00PM, the usage of proactive time is greatest.

(2) Self-Initiated Activity by Category

Unlike community-generated calls for service, self-initiated activity is typically more concentrated over a few call types:

Most Common Categories of Self-Initiated Activity

Incident Type	# CFS	HT
BUILDING CHECK	29,222	17.4
OCCUPIED CAR CHECK	24,810	22.0
DIRECTED PATROL	19,304	38.7
FOOT PATROL	16,835	26.8
PEDESTRIAN CHECK	8,150	36.4
INVESTIGATION	6,782	93.3
BUSINESS INTERVIEW	4,189	23.1
PROBLEM SOLVING	3,888	83.7
UNOCCUPIED CAR CHK	3,571	15.9
TRAFFIC VIOLATION	2,885	14.8
All Other Types	10,409	46.8
Total	**130,045**	**32.2**



Interestingly, Traffic Violation incidents (i.e., traffic stops) are the tenth most common category of self-initiated activity. This is highly unusual, as traffic stops are often the first or second most frequent type of officer-initiated activity for patrol officers. It is unclear whether this is due to strategic direction, legislative reform, or deference to the specialized Traffic Unit. If it is discovered that the relative lack of traffic stops are not a results of any of the aforementioned external reasons, then this would be a direct example of how there is a lack of proactive time available to officers, as traffic stops are a prime example of a way in which proactive time can be spent while on patrol.

(3) Total Utilization

The proactive time analysis demonstrated very little capacity to conduct self-initiated activity, and yet, over 130,000 self-initiated incidents were generated by patrol in 2019. This equates to more than a third of all incidents patrol units were involved in, whether community-generated or officer-initiated.

Taking this perspective further, the total workload involved in handling community-generated calls for service and self-initiated incidents can be combined into a total utilization figure. Expressed as a percentage, total utilization can show how much of officers' net available time on duty is spent handling workloads – whether community-generated or self-initiated. The following chart presents this analysis on a basis of four-hour blocks by day:

Total Utilization (CFS + SI Workload as a % of Net Available Hours) (2019)

	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Overall
2am–6am	54%	39%	41%	40%	40%	42%	49%	**44%**
6am–10am	57%	71%	72%	74%	74%	76%	61%	**69%**
10am–2pm	94%	109%	117%	117%	116%	120%	102%	**111%**
2pm–6pm	87%	101%	108%	105%	105%	105%	92%	**101%**
6pm–10pm	79%	85%	90%	85%	88%	88%	85%	**86%**
10pm–2am	65%	65%	69%	65%	68%	74%	79%	**69%**
Overall	75%	79%	83%	81%	82%	84%	78%	**81%**


Values above 100% indicate that report writing is largely deferred to the end of the shift, as there is more activity – whether community-generated or self-initiated – than there is time to complete it. In a two-officer car, reports can also be split up, allowing for more workload to be completed in the same amount of time.

Regardless, it is evident from the chart that officers are totally utilized throughout much of the daytime period. There are largely no opportunities to use discretionary time further to conduct more self-initiated activity.

(4) Self-Initiated Activity Trends by Year

In comparison to calls for service, variation in self-initiated activity from year to year is far more extensive, as illustrated by the following chart:

Calls for Service vs Self-Initiated Incidents (2016-2020)



Surprisingly, as proactive time decreased slightly in 2019, the usage of that time to generate self-initiated activity rose dramatically. This finding cannot be explained by changes to regular staffing allocations; however, units deployed on overtime may have contributed to the higher rate of activity.

4. District Discretionary Time and Reallocation

The following sections replicate the analysis of patrol workload, staffing, and use of discretionary time at the district level, as well as analysis of alternative systems for allocating resources.

(1) District Workload

To examine staff capacity and determine whether staffing levels are inadequate – or whether there are issues of equity among the districts – 2019 is used as the base, given that it is the most recent year of data available outside of 2020, which is affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Multi-year data is provided later in this chapter.

The table below provides a breakdown of workload elements by district, including average handling time (HT) for both primary and backup unit responses:

Workload Factors by District (2019)

	Primary Units		Backup Units	
District	# CFS	Avg. HT	# Backup	Avg. HT
First	38,126	40.0	24,303	27.1
Second	33,311	37.5	20,182	23.7
Third	35,080	37.4	21,465	24.3
Fourth	45,418	40.8	28,909	28.0
Fifth	41,956	44.1	25,008	31.9
Sixth	40,305	41.6	25,398	30.4
Total	**234,196**	**40.4**	**145,265**	**27.8**

The Fifth District has the highest per-call workload, at 44.1 minutes of handling time for the primary unit, in addition to comparably higher backup unit handling time.

With estimated report writing workloads added based on calls for service, the total hours of workload for patrol units can be calculated by district:

Patrol Workload by District (2019)

District	Total Workload Hours	% of Workload Hours (2019)
First	43,484	16%
Second	34,997	13%
Third	37,100	14%
Fourth	52,867	20%
Fifth	51,919	19%
Sixth	48,302	18%
Total	**268,671**	**100%**

The share of workload in each district will be central to examining the potential for units to be redeployed in order to mitigate service level inequities.

(2) District Staffing Methodology

The following table uses the same methodology that was used in the overall staffing analysis to convert allocated positions to those specifically functioning in regular patrol roles – excluding details, detachments, long-term injury and leave, or any other reason that would take an officer away from normal patrol duties:

Calculation of Deployed Patrol Units by District (2019)

District	# Officers Allocated	# Officers in Patrol Roles	Modeled # Patrol Cars
First	72	59	42
Second	76	62	45
Third	84	69	50
Fourth	76	62	45
Fifth	83	68	49
Sixth	84	69	50
Total	**475**	**390**	**281**

The number of patrol units can then be used to calculate net availability, by multiplying each staffing figure by the average number of deployed work hours per unit:

Patrol Unit Net Available Hours by District (2019)

District	Modeled # Patrol Units	Patrol Unit Net Available Hours	% of Patrol Staffing
First	42	62,778	14.9%
Second	45	67,263	16.0%
Third	50	74,736	17.8%
Fourth	45	67,263	16.0%
Fifth	49	73,242	17.4%
Sixth	50	74,736	17.8%
Total	**281**	**420,018**	**100.0%**

Patrol staffing is relatively equal by district – no district has staffing levels greater or less than 10% of the average. If proactive time was equalized among each district, this would require each district to have roughly the same amount of workload. As shown earlier, this is far from being true; and consequently, there are vast differences in proactive time by district.

(3) District Proactive (Discretionary) Time


Building off of the steps outlined in the previous sections, the following table calculates proactive (discretionary) time by subtracting workload hours from net available hours, then dividing the result (i.e., the number of uncommitted hours) by net available hours:

Calculation of Proactive Time by District (2019)


District	Net Available Hours	Total Workload Hours	Uncommitted Hours	% Proactive Time
First	62,778	43,484	19,294	30.7%
Second	67,263	34,997	32,265	48.0%
Third	74,736	37,100	37,637	50.4%
Fourth	67,263	52,867	14,395	21.4%
Fifth	73,242	51,919	21,322	29.1%
Sixth	74,736	48,302	26,434	35.4%
Total	**420,018**	**268,671**	**151,347**	**36.0%**

This is also calculated on an hourly basis by district, with red bars indicating that there are moderate to severe staffing deficiencies at those times:


District Proactive (Discretionary) Time by District (2019)




Third




Fourth



Fifth



Sixth




Given the extensive differences in proactive time by hour, it is evident that the everyday experience of an officer in certain districts is fundamentally different from an officer in another. Some districts have staffing issues at virtually no times, while others are almost always experiencing staffing deficiencies.

For example, an officer on duty in the Third or Fourth District would have ample time in the late afternoon to handle workload, while still also able to be proactive, with discretionary time sitting around 35-45%. In contrast, officers assigned to either the Fourth or Fifth District have proactive time levels that are often in the single digits or even low negative values, which indicates that there is more workload occurring during those times than there is capacity to handle it. This indicates that officers are frequently going from call to call, with calls even stacking in queue at times, increasing response times – particularly for lower-priority incidents.

(4) Resource Allocation Issues in Recent Years

In general, the relationship between workload in each district versus the staff allocated handle it has not been consistent from year to year. The following chart series shows this relationship, with the gap between the workload and staffing lines being reflective of the amount of proactive time:

Patrol Staffing (Net Available Hours) vs. Workload Hours (2016–2020)



The Fourth District is illustrative in this regard. Workload and staffing were essentially the same in 2016, equating to a proactive time level of around zero – thus, severely understaffed. The next year, staffing in that district was increased significantly, which

increased proactive time to just under 29%, despite workload remaining virtually the same as the previous year, when proactive time was around zero.

Another notable example is that in Fifth District around 2017–2018, workload began to gradually rise, while staffing allocations diminished. This resulted in the level of proactive time dropping to 29%.

(5) Developing an Alternative Staffing Plan to Equalize Resources

These examples highlight the importance of workload-based resource allocation, where staffing decisions follow a rationalized, data-driven process that measures the workload in each district. The relationship between workload and staffing should be kept as even as possible, which requires regularly calls for service to inform staffing allocation decisions.

Currently, as of January 2022, 380 officers are assigned to regular patrol roles[6]. The following table presents the outcome of the alternative resource allocation approach, allocating the 380 officers proportionally based on workload:

Patrol Proactivity if Staffing Allocated Proportionally to Workload

District	% of Workload Hours (2019)	Patrol Officers Assigned by %	+/- From Current	% Proactive Time
First	16%	62	10	33.4%
Second	13%	49	-10	34.4%
Third	14%	52	-16	34.8%
Fourth	20%	75	9	34.4%
Fifth	19%	73	6	34.2%
Sixth	18%	68	0	34.8%
Total	**100%**	**380**[6]	**0**	**36.0%**

Allocating officers proportionally to workload is able to achieve greater equalization in proactive time, and therefore, service levels.

Implementing such a system also requires greater transparency in staffing allocations, however. Specifically, the number that are actually assigned to specifically patrol roles

[6, 6] Current staffing figure is based on an internal one-time staffing analysis which was corroborated by watch sheets corresponding to approximately the same period. As a result, the number should be considered as highly accurate, and does not utilize assumptions.

should be more clear. While this issue has been discussed previously as part of the overall patrol staffing analysis, addressing the problem would be a prerequisite step in achieving more efficient and equitable deployment of staff by district.

(6) District Staffing Needs

Staffing needs can be calculated for each district based on the overall staffing analysis on page , which demonstrates that 438 officer positions should be assigned to regular patrol roles in order to reach the target level of 40% proactive time. If a total of 438 officers are assigned proportionally based on each district's share of 2019 workload, then each district will have approximately 40% proactive time:

Calculation of District Staffing Needs

District	% of Workload Hours (2019)	Req. Officers @ 40% Proactivity	+/- Officers From Current (2022)
First	16%	70	+18
Second	13%	57	-2
Third	14%	61	-7
Fourth	20%	87	+21
Fifth	19%	83	+16
Sixth	18%	78	+10
Total	**100%**	**436**	+56

As discussed in the overall staffing analysis, these figures are inclusive only of officers assigned to regular patrol roles. Current 2022 staffing figures, which were developed through an internal staffing analysis and department watch sheets, show that 380 are officers are assigned to regular patrol roles out of the 463 staffing information are formally allocated.

(7) District Call for Service and Self-Initiated Trends (2016–2020)

In reviewing call for service and self-initiated incident trends by district, it is evident that year-over-year changes in the use of proactive time are not uniform across the city:


Call for Service and Self-Initiated Incident Trends by District

		First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth
CFS	2016	38,290	33,123	39,853	53,732	36,330	38,997
	2017	38,991	33,541	39,729	53,340	37,489	37,486
	2018	39,972	32,746	37,905	43,538	42,458	39,845
	2019	38,156	33,333	35,102	45,436	41,986	40,332
	2020	39,201	30,311	34,423	40,715	38,332	38,641
	+/-5YR	2.4%	-8.5%	-13.6%	-24.2%	5.5%	-0.9%

		First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth
SI	2016	17,053	19,466	16,113	27,038	21,361	12,137
	2017	15,589	19,425	13,256	20,887	16,909	10,954
	2018	16,513	22,951	13,960	16,512	13,469	12,089
	2019	26,915	31,241	21,916	22,910	12,337	14,743
	2020	16,118	21,598	15,673	11,794	11,206	9,174
	+/-5YR	-5.5%	11.0%	-2.7%	-56.4%	-47.5%	-24.4%


The following series of charts mirrors the data shown in the table in a visual format:

Calls for Service vs. Self-Initiated Incidents by District (2016–2020)



Another way to visualize the trends is to use 2016 as a base and overlay the year-over-year percentage change that occurs in each district:

Percentage Change From 2016 Levels by District



Calls for service have remained relatively stable compared to self-initiated activity, which has fluctuated significantly. Following the 2018 unrest in the wake of Ferguson, self-initiated activity rose sharply overall, reflecting significant increases in all but the Fourth and Fifth districts.

(8) Use of Proactive (Discretionary) Time by District

While the amount of discretionary time varies markedly by district, the differences in how it is used are far more striking.

The following charts examines these differences in how proactive time is used by district, adjusted for how much proactive time is available in each district. For each of the most common incident types, each district's cell is shaded according to whether it represents a greater proportion of its self-initiated activity compared to others.

In other words, the chart attempts to answer the question: *When discretionary time is available, what types of self-initiated activities do officers focus on more so than in other districts?*

Relative Differences in Proactive Time Usage by District (2019)

Incident Type	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth
BUILDING CHECK	7,647	9,144	1,611	3,484	1,667	5,670
OCCUPIED CAR CHECK	5,670	3,705	5,021	3,611	3,742	3,062
DIRECTED PATROL	771	7,616	7,196	1,907	1,346	475
FOOT PATROL	2,980	4,708	1,751	5,635	1,220	541
PEDESTRIAN CHECK	2,028	528	1,334	2,520	1,065	677
INVESTIGATION	950	1,057	1,147	1,328	1,129	1,171
BUSINESS INTERVIEW	1,154	1,156	1,039	615	151	74
PROBLEM SOLVING	928	604	524	387	358	1,089
UNOCCUPIED CAR CHECK	1,556	933	463	219	175	226
TRAFFIC VIOLATION	1,640	391	327	229	123	175
DISTURBANCE	192	157	225	473	160	177
SUSP. OCCUPANT – AUTO	116	72	191	204	236	107
# SI Incidents	26.9k	31.2k	21.9k	22.9k	12.3k	14.7k

For instance, while First District and Sixth District have comparable numbers of Problem Solving events, because Sixth District has about half of the total self-initiated activity of First District, it represents far more of a percentage of its activity.

A number of findings can be made from this analysis. Traffic Violations events (i.e., traffic stops), which appear to be made by regular patrol units far less often than in many other jurisdictions, are only a major use of time in First District. Oddly, districts

that practice more of a focus on occupied car checks have significantly less of a focus on unoccupied car checks, and vice versa.

5. Analysis of Call Diversion Feasibility


The following analysis examines opportunities to divert call for service workloads from responses by sworn officers, such as establishing a field civilian classification that can handle certain types of low priority, non-emergency calls.

(1) Overview of Call Diversion

Over the past few decades, more and more has been asked of police officers. Police have been called to function as social services practitioners in responding to issues of homelessness, intervene in situations involving persons experiencing mental health crisis, and serve numerous other roles beyond what was expected of them in the past. At the same time, service level expectations have not diminished. Perhaps more than ever, police have been asked to respond to minor, non-emergency calls such as non-injury accidents, and calls that do not inherently require the skillsets of an armed law enforcement officer.

Although this analysis focuses on the establishing a civilian field responder classification to handle low-priority calls for service, it is critical to stress that this is part of a greater picture of call diversion. Reducing police workload involves using not only civilian field responders, but also emphasizing and expanding phone and online reporting, as well as using other city agencies and non-profit organizations to handle certain types of calls, particularly those with a social services nexus, such as those relating to mental health or the experience of homelessness.

The following pair of diagrams provide an illustrative model for how call diversion can reduce the involvement of police in handling certain types of workload, instead handling those calls through other means:



As this shows, call diversion is a multitude of different approaches that can jointly work toward developing alternatives to sworn response and free up patrol officers' time to be proactive and focus on more severe calls for service.

To determine the number of calls that could feasibly be handled by a civilian field responder, the project team analyzed SLMPD CAD data, specifically focusing on 2019 given that 2020 data is heavily affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

(2) Common Approaches to Civilian Call Diversion

Diversion of calls for service to civilian responders is commonly created as a community service officer (CSO) program, where civilians are hired and trained by the police department to operate in the field and respond to calls that would have otherwise been assigned to patrol officers.

It is important to consider that CSO programs are not typically created as a cost saving measure, but instead to provide a higher level of service than would have otherwise been provided. If patrol officers are often busy going call to call, a lower-priority call for service may have an extended response time, resulting in impacts to service levels. By contrast, a CSO, who *only* focuses on those types of calls, could potentially respond much quicker.

Given their training and expertise, most CSO programs have limited criteria for the types of calls that they can respond to. Still there are prevailing practices, as this analysis will show, for a wide range of calls to be handled by civilians that, in aggregate, represent a sizable portion of patrol workload. This includes many calls involving crimes being reported, such as burglaries (cold burglaries only), fraud, and theft incidents, as well as a number of process-oriented workloads, such as events involving lost/found property or recovered stolen property.

Although the exact types of calls that CSOs are able to respond to vary among agencies, there are a few common characteristics that are applicable to most programs:

- For events that involves a crime report, the crime must have occurred in the past, and there are no suspects on scene.
- There cannot be two conflicting parties, such as in a domestic dispute incident.
- The call will not potentially require an arrest to be made.

These characteristics ensure that a civilian would be able to safely handle the call, and that the skillsets unique to a sworn officer are not required, such as the ability to use physical force.

Dispatchers assigns CSOs to calls instead of sworn officers using information obtained through the normal call taking process, which is designed to inform officers of risks and security issues, as well as the type of response that is needed. By working within the call taking and dispatch framework that already exists, the only significant change is occurs in the workflow for which type of unit should be dispatched.

For instance, call takers already determine if the event is in progress, has just occurred, or is past tense in nature. This is particularly important for call types such as burglaries, which can either be cold, past-tense events with minimal risk or active events that could feature significant risk to life and safety.

(3) Comparative Analysis of Call Diversion Approaches

In order to provide a foundation for the analysis of call diversion feasibility, the project team conducted a comparative review of agencies that deploy civilian CSOs to handle calls for service in the field. For each of these agencies, CAD data has been analyzed using the same methodology as in SLMPD call analysis.

Agencies can have vastly different approaches to categorizing calls, which can make comparisons difficult. In this case, agencies have been selected partly for their similarity in call types, which is aided by the fact that the agencies are all from the same state, and thus are reflective of the same state penal code numbering system. Nonetheless, some aggregation of call types was needed in order to group calls under the same broadly defined categories. For instance, one agency's CAD data may have a call type for "Missing Juvenile" but not "Runaway Juvenile", whereas other agencies' data may have distinct call types for each. Given that the first case would include both call types, these categories can be aggregated as one. Additionally, call types with upgraded severity are excluded. For instance, in agencies where there is a separate, less common call type for burglaries in progress, these are excluded.

It should also be noted that in the call types shown in the comparative data do not comprise all of the calls that each agency's CSOs respond to. Call types have been selected for their comparability between different agencies, as well as their impact (i.e., how many calls of that type were handled by CSOs). Consequently, there are a plethora of call types that each agency's CSOs handle but are not included as table category. Many of these additional call types correspond to various type of minor ordinance/code violation, report, or other information for police.

Furthermore, there are important considerations for how the percentages should be interpreted. The data shown is based on the actual number of CSO responses to those calls. There may have been significantly more calls that CSOs *could* have handled based on their criteria, but did not for one reason or another, such as all CSOs being busy at the time of the event.

The following table summarizes the results of this comparative analysis, showing percentage of calls that were diverted to CSOs in each agency by type of call. The **overall diversion rate** statistic shown in the table displays the percentage of calls for service that CSOs handled during the hours and days they are on duty for. This includes the calls that are diverted that do not fit under any of the categories included in the

table. Nonetheless, the overall diversion rate can function as an effective barometer of how well diversion has been implemented.

% of Calls Handled by CSOs During Their On-Duty Hours

Type	Fremont	Rancho Cordova	Roseville	Mountain View	West Sacramento	Avg.	Max
Traffic Hazard	50%	11%		50%		**37%**	**50%**
Theft	25%	41%	39%	35%	53%	**39%**	**53%**
Accident (Non-Inj.)	20%	22%	14%	42%		**25%**	**42%**
Theft From Vehicle	65%	41%	56%	46%	66%	**55%**	**66%**
Auto Theft	66%	45%	42%	55%	62%	**54%**	**66%**
Recovered Stolen	65%	44%	35%	58%	21%	**45%**	**65%**
Lost/Found Property	70%	18%	47%	67%	50%	**50%**	**70%**
Graffiti	56%		80%		50%	**62%**	**80%**
Vandalism	15%	20%	37%	47%	49%	**34%**	**49%**
Runaway/Missing	50%	25%	40%	48%	37%	**40%**	**50%**
Burglary-Residential	60%	38%	39%	52%	50%	**48%**	**60%**
Burglary-Comm.	74%	60%	39%	60%	50%	**57%**	**74%**
Fraud		15%	33%	49%	63%	**40%**	**63%**
Parking Complaint	82%		27%	70%		**60%**	**82%**
Grand Theft		21%	31%	30%	59%	**35%**	**59%**
Accident (Min. Inj.)	16%	15%	12%	47%		**23%**	**47%**
Pickup		12%		93%		**53%**	**93%**
Diversion Rate	**20%**	**11%**	**10%**	**29%**	**12%**	**16%**	**29%**

In many cases, particularly Rancho Cordova, Roseville, and West Sacramento, the percentages may have been driven lower as a result of limited CSO staffing. Theoretically, department policy would have allowed for a greater percentage of calls to

be handled by CSOs, given that the characteristics of type of call would not be significantly different from city to city. For example, minor non-injury accidents likely to be similar in nature regardless of the city – if one agency is able to divert 60% of such incidents, it is reasonable to expect that the other agencies could potentially divert an equivalent percentage of calls.

As a result, the *maximum* values for the percentage of calls for service that are diverted to CSOs are ultimately more relevant to this analysis, as they provide a measure for the upper potential for such a program.

(4) Estimated Potential for Call Diversion

Based on the comparative analysis on the types of calls that other agencies divert to civilian responders, the project team compared SLMPD call types for analogous categories. In many cases, the incident types are similar, but as in the comparative analysis, there are key differences that affect how the data should be used.

For instance, SLMPD does not differentiate call types between injury and non-injury accidents. Instead, there are two relevant categories – "Accident" and "Accident Information". Presumably, however, if all accident categories in other agencies that do differentiate were added together, the proportion of accidents that do not involve injury is likely similar to the proportion of incidents in the SLMPD "Accident" category. Thus, the estimated percentage of these calls that can be diverted should factor in the understanding that the category represents a broader spectrum of calls.

Call types such as "Parking Problem" or "Auto Abandoned" are more straightforward, and it can be assumed with a high level of confidence that most of these calls can be diverted to a civilian.

With these assumptions in place, the project team selected analogous SLMPD call types and applied estimates for the percentage that could be diverted based on the prevailing practices established by other agencies with such programs:

Estimated Potential for SLMPD Call Diversion to Civilian Responders (2019)

Incident Type	# CFS	Avg. HT (min.)	% Diverted	# Diverted	Hours Diverted
Accident	14,256	47.2	40%	5,702	4,484
Accident Information	1,070	44.0	40%	428	314
Assist Motorist	2,399	31.9	50%	1,200	638
Traffic Control	452	57.6	50%	226	217
Parking Violation	5,217	117.0	80%	4,174	8,140
Auto Abandoned	568	55.8	80%	454	423
Larceny	2,700	44.3	55%	1,485	1,096
Larceny From Vehicle	514	47.6	65%	334	265
Fraud	211	54.3	65%	137	124
Auto Theft	992	47.0	65%	645	505
Burglary	3,553	56.5	60%	2,132	2,008
Destruction Of Property	1,639	43.7	50%	820	597
Tampering With An Auto	947	36.0	50%	474	284
Dumping Rubbish[7]	648	124.5	75%	486	1,008
Overdose	1,810	15.8	65%	1,177	309
Person Down	2,185	12.7	40%	874	185
Missing Person	1,338	51.1	50%	669	569
Recovered Article	806	75.6	70%	564	710
Recovered Auto	392	56.1	65%	255	238
Total	**41,697**	**31.8**	**18%**	**22,234**	**22,117**

[7] This category of calls was identified as being an issue of particular focus for the department, with significant overtime currently being directed toward this enforcement effort.


Based on 2019 data, up to 41,697 community-generated calls for service could be diverted to civilian responders, representing 18% of the calls for service handled by SLMPD. Diverting this many calls would fundamentally change field operations and the level of service SLMPD is able to provide. In total, this would divert as many as 22,117 hours of workload from sworn patrol officers – not including any estimated report time.

(5) Staffing Requirements to Implement Call Diversion

The feasibility of implementing a CSO classification depends both on how they are staffed, the objectives set for them to achieve in terms of workload diverted, as well as how they are deployed.

To examine how CSOs would need to be deployed, the following chart provides a visualization of when the divertible call types are most likely to occur:

Frequency of Divertible Calls by Hour (2019)



The bulk of divertible calls occur during day and afternoon watch hours – approximately 84% of these calls overall. Narrowed down a bit further, about 74% of divertible calls occur within a 12-hour window from 7:00AM to 7:00PM. During this time period, about 5-8 divertible calls are typically occurring per hour.

To calculate staffing requirements, a utilization target is factored in to add a buffer for CSOs. By assuming that 85% of their on-duty time should be utilized, CSOs would have at least some breaks between calls at times, while also providing room for day-to-day and seasonal variability in workload. The estimated net available hours per CSO – representing the time that they are on duty after deducting for leave, training, etc. – would be moderately higher than it is for patrol officers, given a lower injury rate, fewer training hours, and typically lower rates of leave accrual for civilian personnel. For this analysis, 1,700 hours per year is be estimated for each CSO's net availability. Using these assumptions, the following table calculates staffing needs for CSOs working in a two-shift configuration working day and afternoon watch hours:

CSO Staffing Needs for Call Diversion (2019)

Workload Hrs. Diverted		19,257
Utilization Target		75%
Hours to Staff		25,676
NA Hours Per CSO	÷	1,700
CSO FTEs Needed	=	15

With a high utilization target, a significant amount of workload can be handled by CSOs relative to the number of positions being added.

A central objective of call diversion is to refocus patrol officers time toward their core skillsets of being proactive, having time to engage with the community, and responding to emergency incidents. By redistributing many types of report-oriented calls to other call handlers, patrol officers are have significantly more availability to do all of the above. In total, diverting 22,117 hours of patrol workload would increase patrol proactive (discretionary) time from 36.0% to 41.3%.

These findings underscore the conclusion that implementing such a program would improve the day-to-day experience of every officer deployed in the field, particularly during the daytime hours when call activity is highest. Furthermore, by providing for

quicker response times to lower-priority incidents, the program would provide significant benefits to the community.

Recommendations:

Create a new Community Service Officer (CSO) classification to handle certain types of low-priority calls for service,

Add 15 CSOs and deploy the positions to patrol day and afternoon watches.

6. Alternative Deployment Strategies

The following chapter provides an evaluation of the current shift schedule and resource allocation, as well as alternative systems for allocating staff to improve efficiency and optimize field deployment.

In the development of alternative shift schedules, the analysis is both quantitative and qualitative. Any new configurations must balance the objectives of optimizing resource deployment with the need to have the schedule be popular with officers and provide for their quality of life concerns to be addressed. The latter part is particularly critical given that work hours, shift length, and workday patterns are all set by the collectively bargained labor agreement made with the Saint Louis Police Officers Association (SLPOA), which covers all sworn personnel. Thus, **changes to work hours or any schedule characteristics must be made through the collective bargaining process**, and cannot be made unilaterally by the department's management.

This presents an advantage to optimizing the current schedule to be efficient and effective over implementing a more radically different option. This particularly true for SLMPD, where a 12-hour shift configuration would not be feasible due to the inadequate staffing levels and low proactive time in patrol that frequently result in officers going from call to call.

Shift schedules alone cannot remedy inadequate staffing levels. That being said, inefficiencies in how staff are deployed can create the same effects of having inadequate staff. Allocation of officers to shift teams should be focused on maximizing resources when workload is highest, allowing for service levels to be equalized throughout the day. Given the degree to which workload varies throughout the day, if staff are simply assigned at equal levels throughout the day, any staffing issues are greatly exacerbated during the daytime when workload is highest.

As a result, this analysis is intended to provide the analytical framework for any discussion on shift schedules as well as how it relates to the broader picture of resource allocation and deployment in the field.

1. Overview of the Current Shift Schedule

Across all six districts, the current shift schedule consists of 8-hour shifts across three watches. The platoons (teams) staffing the day and afternoon watches (Platoon A and Platoon B) switch work hours at regular intervals.

Staffing Calculations by Platoon (2019)

Shift	Start	End	# of Patrol Officers Allocated	# Officers Assigned in Patrol Roles
Platoon A	0700	1500	154	126
Platoon B	1500	2300	171	140
Platoon C	2300	0700	150	123
Total	–	–	**475**	**390**

Each platoon is specific to each district, and is further broken down into six brackets per platoon. The brackets represent a shared set of workdays, with all officers assigned to that bracket working the same days. This is also true for certain details that brackets are assigned to work, such as for a parade, as well as for holiday scheduling.

As of January 2022, 380 officers are currently assigned to regular patrol roles, out of 463 allocated.

It should also be noted that in this analysis, the number of patrol officers, rather than patrol units (cars) is focused on in the scheduling analysis in order to avoid overcomplicating the issue. The background calculations showing the effects and needs of these staffing levels, however, continue to use the same methodology to model for how patrol officers are deployed in patrol cars.


2. Reconfiguration of the Shift Schedule

In theory, the current 8-hour schedule allows for resources to be staggered across the workweek, while not relying on overlaps between shifts to staff hours with higher activity. Instead, a three-team configuration allows for natural break points to be established in setting shift hours, where staff can be adjusted as needed to meet workload demands. As a result, the night shift is able to only cover hours that are less active – thus allowing for fewer staff to be assigned – whereas resources assigned to the day and afternoon watches can be maximized.

This presents an important consideration that, while the night shift staffing is primarily based on emergency response capabilities and officer safety, the staffing levels for day and afternoon watch hours (platoons A and B) should be staffed based primarily on workload.

The following chart calculates the number of officers that need to be scheduled across all brackets to reach 30% proactive (discretionary) time, based on staff capacity and workload, compared to the current number scheduled across platoons, A, B, and C:

 # Officers Scheduled on Platoons to Reach 30% Proactive Time by Hour (2019)



Clearly, during the later hours of day watch hours (beginning around noon), as well as most of the afternoon watch hours, have significantly higher staffing requirements to achieve the same level of proactive time.

Within the confines of the existing schedule, in terms of workdays, shift length, and shift start times, resource allocation can be best maximized through the following process:

1. To allocate staff to districts, officers should be allocated proportionally based on workload, as examined previously in the analysis. For example, if a district has 20% of the community-generated (i.e., excluding self-initiated) workload handled by the department, it should be allocated 20% of the patrol officers.

2. Assess the number required to staff the night watch hours for officer safety and emergency response capabilities. Using Fourth District's assignment of 19 officers on Platoon C (night watch) as a minimum, this would equate to 114 officers across all six districts.

- Five of six brackets in each district would be assigned 2 patrol officers, with the sixth being assigned 3 (regular patrol roles only – excluding those on detachments, details, etc.), for a total of 19 officers per district on Platoon C teams, or 114 citywide.
- Factoring in 2019 net availability statistics and bracket workday patterns (i.e., after accounting for leave, injury, days off, training, etc.), this would result in each district having about 9.6 officers on average being on duty on a given night, or approximately 57 citywide. This also does not include any officers on overtime, sergeants, or other units.

3. After deducting the 19 officers from each district's allocation, the remaining officers are assigned to either Platoon A or B (Day or Afternoon, rotating) proportionally based on total workload in each district for the hours Platoon A and B work. This is done as follows:

- Excluding Platoon C (night watch), the percentage of workload hours during day and afternoon watch hours (Platoon A and Platoon B):

Platoon A and B (Day and Afternoon Watch) Workload Proportions

District	Watch	Total Workload	% Share
First	Day	16,022	46.6%
	Afternoon	18,339	53.4%
Second	Day	13,915	48.6%
	Afternoon	14,714	51.4%
Third	Day	13,630	46.7%
	Afternoon	15,552	53.3%
Fourth	Day	20,303	49.0%
	Afternoon	21,145	51.0%
Fifth	Day	20,121	48.7%
	Afternoon	21,201	51.3%
Sixth	Day	18,462	48.7%
	Afternoon	19,415	51.3%

– These percentages are used to allocate the remaining officers in each district that have not already been assigned to Platoon C:

Allocation of Officers to Platoons A and B (Day and Afternoon Watches)

District	Watch	# Officers	% Share	# Allocated
First	Day	43	46.6%	**20**
	Afternoon		53.4%	**23**
Second	Day	30	48.6%	**15**
	Afternoon		51.4%	**15**
Third	Day	33	46.7%	**15**
	Afternoon		53.3%	**18**
Fourth	Day	56	49.0%	**27**
	Afternoon		51.0%	**29**
Fifth	Day	54	48.7%	**26**
	Afternoon		51.3%	**28**
Sixth	Day	49	48.7%	**24**
	Afternoon		51.3%	**25**

Given that platoons A and B rotate work hours at regular intervals, adjustments would need to be made to ensure that the afternoon shift – whether covered by Platoon A or Platoon B at the time always retains additional personnel. This would likely require collective bargaining processes, given that it would require a few officers from each platoon 'skip' a rotation and be held back instead in order to keep officer totals higher on that platoon.

4. The process results in the following allocation of officers, using current (January 2022) staffing numbers of strictly officers that are assigned to patrol:

Resulting Allocation of Officers by Platoon (2022 Staffing)

District	Platoon	# Officers
First	Platoon A	20
	Platoon B	23
	Platoon C	19
Second	Platoon A	15
	Platoon B	16
	Platoon C	19
Third	Platoon A	15
	Platoon B	18
	Platoon C	19
Fourth	Platoon A	27
	Platoon B	29
	Platoon C	19
Fifth	Platoon A	26
	Platoon B	28
	Platoon C	19
Sixth	Platoon A	24
	Platoon B	25
	Platoon C	19
Total		**380**

Using this system for the allocation of officers to each district and platoon, where platoon assignments are made proportionally based on community-generated workload, service levels and capabilities can be consistently equalized across shifts. While this does not address the overall issue of insufficient staffing, it prevents it from being further exacerbated, as is the case currently. Instead, by rationalizing the system for allocating resources and by adding transparency yo the number of staff that are functioning day-to-day in regular patrol roles would fundamentally benefit the

experience of officers on duty, particularly in areas and on shifts that are currently understaffed.

Recommendations:

Adopt the revised system for allocating officers to patrol platoons using a workload-based methodology.

APPENDIX 2:
THE ST. LOUIS NJD QR CODE

St. Louis NJD QR Code



APPENDIX 3:
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT TOOL

Community Engagement Qualitative Assessment Tool - Coded

Name	Organization/Title	Race	Gender/ Pronouns	Major Theme 1	Major Theme 2	Major Theme 3	Major Theme 4
1	Non-profit	White	she/her	No public input on policing and public safety	Don't have enough data, or even know where to access to data, to make an informed opinion on policing in STL	Increased involvement of mental health professionals is necesssary in policing	Ineffective policing oversight body
2	Activist Coalition	White	he/him	Mechanisms are not great at allowing for community input into public safety and dissatisfied with the ways the public is allowed to give input	Police accountability should be "civilianized" and more transparent	The need to send the appropriate responder to the appropriate calls. SWAT is overused	Shotspotter having detrimental effects in black communities
3	Non-profit	Black	she/her	Other professionals need to be involved in interventions along with the police. (Alternative/co-response)	General dissatisfaction with the policing oversight board and lack of transparency regarding complaints	More needs to be done on housing/ homelessness	Need for more community outreach and forums for the community to give opinions and feedback
4	Activist group/ Non-profit	Black	they/them	Community outreach has improved under the Jones administration, but more needs to be done to get feedback. There needs to be better, more direct, outreach.	CBO needs to be overhauled, there shouldn't be any LEA/police representation on it, needs to have more direct community involvement	PD needs to be divested from and more money put into the community (healthcare, education etc)	"Criminalization of survival/ poverty/ sex work/ drug use, pretrial detention is a mess (like folks being held on no bonds)"
5	Activist group/ Non-profit	White	he/him	Public safety should first, and foremost, use a public health lens. Need to focus on basic needs rather than ask questions about policing.	Thinking about public safety through the idea of "response" means you're already behind. We need to have more finances on the front end to prevent the need for response. More community based deescalation training. Need to reduce the size and scope of the criminal punishment system	Gun violence is a huge issue, we should be studying and tackling the underlying issues of *why* people want to own guns	The mayor is accountable to the right people (vulnerable groups). But business and special interests are still prioritized too much in current public safety plans
6	Activist group/ Non-profit	Black	she/her	Education system needs to change and children should not be criminalized at a young age. Education needs more on African American history.	To start the process of rebuilding community trust, the government needs to issue a public apology for past traumas induced.	Defund the police, department's vacant positions and shotspotter	Accountability/oversight body should not have ties to the PD. It should be seperate from government institutions
7	City Employee	Black	she/her	Too many departments under the Public Safety Department, this makes it hard to identify differing needs of each and provide support adequately.	Having oversight housed under the Public Safety is a conflict of interest, it should be seperate and silo-ed so there's complete seperation from the PD and PS Dept so it can have more leverage and power.	Any positive rapport built by SLMPD's community engagement officers is cancelled out by all the racial disparities in the PD's interactions with community	Staffing in all city departments (especially the COB) is a big issue and needs to be resolved as soon as possible
8	Activist/ Lawyer	Black	she/her	Economic depravation is causing significant problems. Vacant/abandoned buildings especially are an issue because they are a safety hazard, are places where crime is concentrated and are a symbol of the city's economic issues	Accountability is more important than transparency (transparency is important), because institutions are not accountable to the community [see interview notes for explanation of Centene in Q5] and more needs to be done, especially the large institutions to make them accountable.	Not enough positive police/community interactions and not relationships between them. Police does not make an effort to build positive relationships with the community	Leadership in the community (churches, nonprofits etc in addition to government) are not doing enough to direct the actions of the community on mass incarceration
9	City Employee	Black	she/her	Both aldermen and COB board members do not do community outreach and this needs to change. Too much infighting in the COB, people are selfish and and don't work collectively	Every city department should do an audit to fully understand what's working and what's not. Most people in city departments haven't even read the ordinances that govern them. Ex. City Marshalls were absorbed into PD in 2013, and only Marshalls have subpoena power. COB was created to have subpoena power in 2015/16 but there is no city body that can issue subpoenas	IED investigations in the PD are severely lacking and not done properly. COB needs to be silo-ed and given power seperate from the department/city offices.	Residents do not have enough avenues to provide feedback on existing work, or work that should be done. Aldermen don't do enough to support community initiatives and there needs to be an evaluation of the public's access to officials and information
10	Non-profit/ activist	Black	he/him	The most crucial thing to address is the education system when it comes to public safety. Providing services and support to kids that don't finish school is crucial to preventing crime	Criminal justice system is unfair, but currently the city needs more cops to deal with crime. A visible police presence is a deterrent to crime	Only the loudest "vocal minority" has an input on public safety issues. There needs to be better outreach. It may be helpful for you (CPE) to go on some black radio talk shows to talk about your recommendations	It's not made easy for the public to submit complaints about the department. There should be more satelitte offices (that aren't PD affiliated) where people should be able to go to submit complaints
11	SLMPD	Black	she/her	The fact that officers can work in one precinct their whole career is an issue. They should be required to work in more than one precinct as a way of improving understandings of diversity. There needs to be less antiquated transfer policies and management opportunities in the PD	Community engagement has always been an afterthought in the department. CE should be everyone's job, not just the community policing division's job. We should be meeting people where they are, but not just in places like in churches, we need to meet people by the highways etc.	Big fan of Cops and Clinicians program, thinks it needs to be expanded but understand there are issues with staffing.	Cops don't need to be sent to every CFS, ex. unarmed/retired officers could be sent to take reports. You don't need to send a two-man car to deal with one person begging (hinting at inefficient resource allocation)
12	Non-profit/activist	Black	she/her	My ideal world is you don't call the police. Mental health and other issues don't require police because they don't handle it well.	The city needs to focus on youth work-- most shootings involve young people. Once they cross the age threshold (18) people begin "washing their hands of them." Young people should be categorized up till 24. School districts have been "in shambles" for decades	The way we deal with unhoused people is shameful. "People need to get housing. Whether temporary or permanent, with the understanding that some people will do better in supervised housing units because of the mental health conditions."	"Hard to tell if policies are burdensome or if there's lack of political will to change/ get things done. Working under multiple mayors has allowed me to see that. The election cycle determines what politicians think of accountability– but people are demanding transparency that doesn't get lost in the bureaucracy"
13	Non-profit	White Hispanic	he/him	COB is "toothless," police union is instrumental in "bad apples" not getting fired. Board meetings should be made public	Percieves police response time to be based on economic zones and tax base	There is a law (unclear if city or state) requiring identification of people who report crimes (shootings)that needs to be repealed immediately	State laws are a hinderance, constitutional (gun) carry laws need to be repealed
14	Healthcare/Non-profit	White	she/her	City really doesn't seem to have its own community outreach strategies or mechanisms. Ideally the department's outreach would happen in casual settings like barbershops, grocery stores etc	Education and access to transportation are both huge issues. Heavy reliance (in the region) on cars is a huge issue	Gun violence is a huge issue, especially because of how the 2nd amendment is protected in MO. It's hard to judge how effective the different violence prevention programs are. Need more info on them.	Street racing has increased dramatically during the pandemic, STL is not great for drivers, it's not safe
15	Healthcare/Non-profit	White	he/him	Improve 911 diversion program by improving funding and improving access for civillians	The communications strategy of the city has been lacking. There is also a clear division between the city and county	Access to capital, loans and high interest rates in poor communities are all signficant issue	Don't know the best way to approach traffic, little things like running red lights and exppired tags are an issue, but also is that just advocating for another form of broken windows policing?
16	Non-profit	White	She/her	State legislature is the biggest hinderences to the City's reform efforts in all sectors	STL is not a "kid-friendly" city, there aren't opportunities for kids to be active. Cashless economy is part of the problem (ex. kids can't go to cardinals games without cash)	I think the Delmar divide is overblown, there is a significant black population that is also extremely poor in South STL.	There needs to be more female police officers
17	Healthcare/Non-profit	Black	She/her	Feels like recently there's been more trust in officers and the city and am getting good testimonials from the jails and hospitals	Unhoused population is a big concern, need to do more to support them and provide them with adequate services	There needs to be stricter gun laws (ex. if you've been charged with DV or other types of assault, you shouldn't be allowed to carry)	Cops and clinicians should be involved with dispatch and listening to those calls.Would like to see the program be made permanent (is currently grant-based funding)
18	Former City Employee	Black	she/her	Likes cops and clinicians, but notes that not enough community members know about the program	The department is not proactive enough in forming relationships with communities	There are lots of laws that allow officers to harrass individuals and community members	Officer Bill of Rights is an issue in Missouri

19	Retired	Black	she/her	"The city needs to do a better job of patrolling rather than showing up after everything has gone to pieces"	It takes the police a while to show up to calls (and sometimes no respose at all)	Education is the most important thing that needs investment-- teaching people the right skills, trades etc	There needs to be more outreach from the department to neighborhoods and apartment buildings
20	Healthcare/Non-profit	Black	she/her	" I see a lot more overpolicing in North St. Louis and when Black people enter spaces that may not be as accepting of Black people."	There needs to be trauma informed care when it comes to police response if we can't have [alternative] response and for politicians to partner with local groups to help creater a broader understanding of public safety	A number of public health issues-- too many liquor stores getting licenses, need to do more to support healthy communities (infant care, green spaces, reducing disparities in access etc). Need more behavorial health hubs	Shotspotter is not working, and when we do call police it takes too long for a response. There needs to be a better way to triage calls.Indicative of the lack of investment of resource in the community. There needs to be equity in investment (education,housing etc)--Delmar is the clear divider
21	Religous Group	White	he/him	The [white] police union (and Jeff Roorda) is one of the biggest issues in policing and public safety in STL and the PD is basically a criminal organization. Has lots of anecdotes of officers threatening and intimidating community members	Lots of officers don't understand the community they're in. Lots of younger officers from south St. Louis have never been to the North side and are told to be scared of the area.	Public safety and policing needs to be fixed from the outside, the system cannot be trusted to oversee itself. Outside people need to make the changes (same way that the President of the US, a civillian, is the commander in chief of the armed forces)	Court costs and the bail system is a huge issue. Causes even more problems among the poorest residents
22	Community Org/City Employee	Black	he/him	City needs to be more proactive than reaction when it comes to community engagement and outreach. PD does absolutely no outreach, it's all only reactive.	(On Delmar divide) there are no roads or routes that connect the north and south of the city. Only roads than go east/west. These invisible borders are creating lots of separation in the city	On a macro-level, the city allows to many funds to be not allocated back to the city because of tax abatements. City services are not funded enough as a result. The city has lost its value because we keep selling it off for names on buildings (talking about corporations getting tax incentives and then leaving when the incentives are done)	The board of alderman are inept and uninformed. Thank god the board is being reduced to 14 from 28.
23	Community Org	White	he/him	I've never been approached or surveyed about my opinions on policing and public safety in St. Louis [despite being an involved, well-connected community member]. In the Krewson admin, we'd get a pamphlet every year outlining the Mayor's accomplishments for the year, it's a surefire way to keep community updated. Jones admin should do this	Poor neighborhoods don't have any amenities or resources (grocery stores, banks etc). White neighborhoods have all of these things. No opportunities for these families to create generational wealth and there is trauma at the highest level for families and kids in these poorer neighborhoods	Cops are not trained to deal with all the things they're asked to respond to. The alternative response models need to grow and we need more clinicians and medical workers	Education is extremely important, I can't tell you the last time I even heard of a public school being built here. Investing in education is the best way to serve the city's kids and families
24	Non-Profit	White	she/her	(On community engagement from the city/PD) The people doing the listening are often not the ones doing the implementing. Should be doing outreach in churches, at community events etc	(In response to Question about alternative response) Police are not trained to deal with mental health calls. Not enough mental health care in this city (or country)	Housing and gun violence are both big issues, but a lot of problems are media-driven, there's an image of public safety that is portrayed and people will refuse to go into downtown which then takes money out of the city (which could be used for public safety purposes)	There's a total disconnect when we talk about what we do for kids vs parents (they're talked about as seperate issues). But how do we expect parents to make minimum wage and adequately support their kids? No way for lots of kids to get to certain afterschool programs, but their parents can't leave work. There needs to be policies supporting families more